## 1NC

### 1NC – Topicality

Our interpretation is that affirmative teams must defend the desirability of the United States federal government substantially increasing its prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws:

#### a---‘Resolved’ denotes a formal resolution.

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### b---‘USfg’ is the 3 branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people

#### c---‘Increase’ means to make greater.

Kristl ’4 [Kenneth T, James R May, Keri N Powell, Howard I Fox, John D Walke, David G McIntosh, Ann B Weeks, Jonathan F Lewis; October 26; Partner at Winston & Strawn LLP, Former Law Clerk to District Court Judge William C. Lee, J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law; Westlaw, Appellate Brief in “the State of New York v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,” WL 5846438]

The sole textual basis EPA asserts for its extraordinary position is an argument based on the word “increases” in §111(a)(4). Specifically, EPA claims that, even when a change causes emissions to rise to the highest level reached in the past ten years, it does not “increase[]” them. EPA Br. 69-71, 86. According to EPA's untenable argument, Congress did not specify how an increase is to be measured, and thus left EPA free to interpret “increases” as it wishes. Id.

The term “increases” is not an empty vessel that EPA can fill as it chooses. Instead, absent further congressional guidance, the term must be given its ordinary meaning. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761 (2004); Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The ordinary meaning of “increase” is “to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality.” Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1999), at 969. Thus, a change that makes emissions greater “increases” them. EPA's interpretation contravenes the Act's plain meaning under Chevron Step One, or in the alternative “diverges from any realistic meaning” under Chevron Step Two. See, e.g., NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000).2

#### d---‘Expanding’ means to increase and ‘the scope’ defines permissible behavior.

Collins ’21 [Collins English Dictionary; copyright updated 2021; Collins Cobuild, “Expand the Scope,” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/expand-the-scope]

expand the scope

These examples have been automatically selected and may contain sensitive content that does not reflect the opinions or policies of Collins, or its parent company HarperCollins.

I wanted to work internationally and expand the scope of my possibilities.

Times, Sunday Times

Labour has called for the government to expand the scope of the test to include consideration of the impact of any merger on research and development and science.

Times, Sunday Times

Most opponents are small-government conservatives who are outraged at any attempt to expand the scope of government, particularly when it involves their personal healthcare decisions.

Times, Sunday Times

The move was cited by the developer to be to expand the scope of indie videogames, and not as a market strategy.

Retrieved from Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/. Source URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afterfall: InSanity

Such results expand the scope of asymmetric hydroboration to more sterically demanding alkenes.

Retrieved from Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/. Source URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metal-catalysed hydroboration

Definition of 'expand'

expand

(ɪkspænd)

Explore 'expand' in the dictionary

VERB

If something expands or is expanded, it becomes larger. [...]

See full entry

COBUILD Advanced English Dictionary. Copyright © HarperCollins Publishers

Definition of 'scope'

scope

(skoʊp)

Explore 'scope' in the dictionary

UNCOUNTABLE NOUN [NOUN to-infinitive]

If there is scope for a particular kind of behaviour or activity, people have the opportunity to behave in this way or do that activity. [...]

#### e---‘Its’ means belonging to the fed.

Updegrave ’91 [W.C.; August 19; Supreme Law.org, “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose,” <http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm>]

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

#### f---‘Core antitrust laws’ are legal statutes.

Pfaffenroth ’21 [Sonia K, Justin P Hedge, and Monique N Boyce; July 1; Partner at Arnold and Porter, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations for the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice; Counsel at Arnold and Porter; Senior Associate at Arnold and Porter; Mondaq, “United States: A Comparison Of Proposed Antitrust Legislation In 2021: Federal And New York State,” https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1086194/a-comparison-of-proposed-antitrust-legislation-in-2021-federal-and-new-york-state#:~:text=At%20the%20federal%20level,%20there,;1%20(2)%20the%20Federal]

At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

Key to limits and ground – they justify a proliferation of small, uncontroversial AFF’s that avoid core generics and water down the quality of debating.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1 – Competitive Equity---an unlimited, unpredictable topic disparately raises the research burden for the negative---treat this as a sufficient win condition because fairness is the logical structure that undergirds all impacts AND controls any benefit to debate.

#### 2 – Clash---Switch-side debates over hypothetical political action is key to develop revolutionary intercommunalism. Prioritizing ideological consistency in debate encourages elitism and dogmatism over the cultivation of vanguard thought—that’s anti-Black.

Vernon, 21—Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, York University (Jim, “Huey Newton’s Lessons for the Academic Left,” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 38, Issue 7-8, 2021, dml) [brackets in original]

In short, Newton and Seale found that their ‘hook-up with white radicals did not give [them] access to the white community because they did not guide the white community’ outside the university (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 51), just as they had ‘problems with black students sometimes because they tend to have a detached understanding of the realities in the black community’ off campus (Seale, 1991: 211). Their continual and withering critique of ‘intellectual jivers … who sit in a fucking armchair and try to articulate the revolution while black people are dying in the streets’ at times appears as a standard call by grassroots activists to place the pressing needs of concrete praxis before the leisurely pursuit of abstract theory (Seale, 1991: 119, 33); and, indeed, Newton claims ‘when Bobby and I left Merritt College to organize brothers on the block we did so because the college students were too content to sit around and analyze without acting’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 99). However, Newton was far from opposed to even highly speculative theorizing; he would, after all, routinely open talks by asking his audience ‘to assume that an external world exists’ before they could procced (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 162).4 His disillusionment with academic activists was not due to the complexity or abstraction necessary for theoretical debate; on the contrary, it was grounded in his experience that ‘when I speak on college campuses … I try to lead an audience into rational and logical discussions, but many students are looking for rhetoric and phrasemongering’ instead, which he felt indicated in his audiences not only an evasion of potentially valid, and thus needed, criticism of their own views, but an implicit elitism concerning off-campus participants in political discourse; as he put it, the students ‘either do not want to learn or they do not believe that I can think’ (Newton, 2009: 68).

Of course, Newton agreed with the white mother country radicals that the fight for black liberation was ‘in essence … not at all a race struggle [but a] struggle between the massive proletarian working class and the small, minority ruling class’ (Seale, 1991: 72); simultaneously, because that class remained internally divided by race and racism, he also held that ‘nationalism is recognized by many who think in a revolutionary manner as a distinct and natural stage through which one proceeds’, explaining, among other things, the Party’s anti-integrationist stance (Harrison, 1970: 151). He thus affirmed the necessity of developing a discourse that would ‘not only … make Blacks more proud but … make whites question and even reject concepts they had always unthinkingly accepted’ (Newton, 2009: 175), which required synthesizing race- and class-based theories of the numerous contradictions that structured social life. His experience with campus radicals, however, led him to believe that their goal, by contrast, was to find ‘a set of actions and a set of principles that are easy to identify and are absolute’ (Newton et al., 2004: 84), which not only deepened the distance between progressive theorists and those most in need of emancipatory thought, but encouraged those in elite positions to instruct, rather than to engage with and listen to, those in whose name they purportedly spoke. For Newton, to ‘attempt to explain phenomena … by taking [them] out of [their concrete] environment, [and] putting them into a category … without understanding everything else related to them’ was to ‘transform’ material, lived realities into reified abstractions that inevitably produced forms of praxis that imposed demands for an impossible ideological purity on a suffering populace living in a nest of economic, biological, psychological, and social contradictions (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 163). This is why Newton ‘tried not to speak in such absolute … terms’ and emphasized the need for theorists to ‘analyse each instance’, rather than subsuming them under an abstract and rigid model treated as ‘an infallible guide in all cases’ (Newton et al., 2004: 26); as his thinking developed, he increasingly cautioned against theorizing that ‘does not apply to the present set of conditions [because it is] tied to a set of thoughts that approaches dogma – what we call flunkeyism’ (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 165).

In fact, while it may seem counterintuitive given the militant positions the Panthers routinely struck in public, for Newton, the tendency among activists emerging from the academy to rigidly ‘draw … the line of demarcation, saying you are on this side and I am on the other … shows a lack of consciousness’ of the situation to be theorized (Newton, 2009: 62); not least because it is grounded in the same sort of absolute distinction between the ‘good’ human beings, cultures, and values and their ‘evil’ inversion or absence that defined the colonial mindset that black power and socialist internationalism were each formed to oppose. He reminds us that:

The African gods south of the Sahara always had at least two heads, one for good and one for evil. Now people make gods in their own image … So the African said, in effect, I am both good and evil; good and evil are the two parts of the thing that is me. This is an example of an internal contradiction.

Western societies split up good and evil, placing God up in heaven and the devil down below. Good and evil fight for control over people in Western religions, but they are two entirely different entities. (Newton et al., 2004: 24)

While the Manichean politics he encountered from both white and black campus-based activists resonates strongly with the struggle of the Good to control, instruct, or conquer the Evil, Newton’s own theorizing was based on the recognition ‘that all things are in a constant state of change, transformation, or flux’ (Hilliard and Weise, 2002: 163), because of ‘the internal contradictions in all things’, including the people themselves (Newton et al., 2004: 108). It is precisely for this reason that Newton, above all, endorses a dialectical5 understanding of social change:

This struggle of mutually exclusive opposing tendencies within everything that exists explains the observable fact that all things … are in a constant state of transformation. Things transform themselves because while one tendency or force is more dominating than another, change is nonetheless a constant, and at some point the balance will alter and there will be a new qualitative development … Now, because things do not stay the same we can be sure of one thing: the owner will not stay the owner, and the people who are dominated will not stay dominated. We don’t know exactly how this will happen, but … we can be sure that if we increase the intensity of the struggle (which is already underway), we will reach a point where the equilibrium of forces will change and there will be a qualitative leap into a new situation with a new social equilibrium. (pp. 25–26)

Thus, above all, what Newton wanted to teach the academic-led Left, is that a genuine vanguard does not reprovingly instruct the people as to what they should will, how they should struggle, or what their personal shortcomings are in the light of externally developed, inflexible, and absolute models or principles; it must proceed, rather, from a ‘great compassion for people’ (Newton et al., 2004: 54), or an understanding of, and empathy with, their inherently conflicted lives and communities. As he puts it, ‘the Black Panther Party is not based upon hate. We feel that [a] revolutionary program must be guided by a feeling of love – armed love we sometimes call it’, premised upon the ‘involvement and acceptance’ of the people not only at every stage, but more importantly ‘as they are’ in their flawed, internally contradictory state (Newton et al., 2004: 50). It is thus as much, and perhaps even more, the academic Left as the administrative Right that Newton has in mind when he laments that:

I don’t think students are taught dialectically, and one of the reasons they are not is that it would be detrimental to the bourgeois educational system to do so. I think that it is a fair statement to say that the schools are agencies of the status quo: … it would be detrimental to them to give students the tools to show [the people] that the status quo cannot stand and [thus] to analyze them out of existence. (Newton et al., 2004: 87)

Thus, while affirming the need for radical thought to emerge from spaces like the university, which can help clarify and guide the people in their ongoing efforts to resolve the contradictions of their lives, he simultaneously and strenuously warns that when radical theorists distance themselves from the community and begin to traffic in moral and political absolutes, they can easily slip into what he called ‘revolutionary cultism’; a temptation into which he admits he fell at various points in the Party’s development.

The revolutionary cultist uses the words of social change … but his actions are so far divorced from the process of revolution and organizing the community that he is living in a fantasy world. So we talk to each other on campuses … thinking these things will produce change without the people themselves. Of course people do courageous things and call themselves the vanguard, but … vanguard means spearhead, and the spearhead has to spearhead something. If nothing is behind it, then it is divorced from the masses and is not the vanguard. (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 70–71)6

What was required, then, was not so much an emphasis on praxis over theory, but a specifically dialectical mode of synthesizing theory and practice that ‘emphasizes a concrete analysis of conditions’ within actual communities and which might help lay the foundation for ‘an appropriate response to these conditions as a way of mobilizing the people and leading them to higher levels of consciousness’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 49). As he puts it toward the end of his statement expelling Eldridge Cleaver from the Party for

influencing us to isolate ourselves from the Black community so that it was war between the oppressor and the Black Panther Party, not war between the oppressor and the oppressed community … Our dialectical ideology and our analysis of concrete conditions indicate that declaring a spontaneous revolution is a fantasy. The people are not at that point now. This contradiction and conflict may seem unfortunate to some, but it is part of the dialectical process. (pp. 51, 53)

For Newton, the structural oppression that communities endure necessitates both that the people are driven to resist and transform their suppressed circumstances (which we can call their ‘good’) and that ‘the opinions of the people have … been molded and directed against their true interests by slick politicians and exploitative educators [whose] diversion tactics often lead the people down blind alleys or onto tangents that take them away from their true goals’ (which thus reflects their ‘evil’) (p. 57, emphasis added); and it is these internally contradictory people – not reified abstractions of them – whose situation requires concrete analysis and to whom this theorizing must ultimately be directed. This, of course, retains radical theory’s traditional goal of providing a compelling critique of the structures which have distorted the lives and opinions of the people; but such critiques can only be both accurate to the community at issue, and more importantly relevant to emancipatory praxis, if they simultaneously learn from the people so as not to impose upon them externally developed, inflexibly applied, and thus elite demands, leaving them prey to organizing by reactionary leaders who speak more directly to their flawed lives and immediate needs.

Newton’s Conception of a Theoretical Vanguard

Vanguard theory, Newton argues, must therefore proceed from the recognition that ‘revolution is a process’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 57, emphasis in original), one which unfolds progressively over an extended period of time as the people themselves come to increasingly identify and struggle for their true interests. Theorists, he therefore argued, can offer essential aid in guiding this process of collective self-determination, but in order to do so, they ‘cannot offer the people conclusions’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 57, emphasis added) regarding the utopian state to be achieved, the form of subjectivity, culture, or contribution required to pursue it, or the absolute principles upon which progressive change rests, for ‘when the revolutionary begins to indulge in … final conclusions, the people do not relate to him. Therefore he is no longer a revolutionary’ (p. 47); because the ‘only time an action is revolutionary is when the people relate to it in a revolutionary way’, theorists ‘must be ready to respond creatively to new conditions and new understandings’ that emerge from the people themselves as they progressively struggle to determine their own destiny (pp. 48, 57).

Theorizing thus remains necessary because revolutionary struggle requires the critical determination and articulation of the contradictions that dominate social relations, as well as the development of speculative forms of praxis directed at their resolution; but Newton reminds us that ‘these contradictions should be resolved in the community’, rather than by purported experts or representatives, for only this makes social change genuinely progressive by grounding it in the actualized will of the people (Newton et al., 2004: 47). Thus as it ‘tries to show the people the way to resolve these problems … the vanguard has to include all the people’, and the people as internally contradictory, in both their theoretical analysis and practical recommendations. Because, as he laments, ‘it will take time to resolve the contradictions of racism and all kinds of chauvinism’ (p. 33), and because only the people themselves can genuinely resolve them, Newton believed the vanguard’s essential task was to determine, articulate, and help build political programs that ‘increase the positive qualities [or ‘good’]’ in the people ‘until they dominate the negative [or ‘evil’] and therefore transform the situation’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 101).

Of course, because the people are not only externally manipulated, but internally enmeshed in varied contradictions, those working to determine these programs often benefit from a partial remove from the circumstances they seek to study. While the university is not the only institution that can fulfil the role, spaces like it, where speculative thought, grounded in even quite esoteric research, can be both developed and forwarded for vigorous and rigorous debate, are needed so that a vanguard thought – one ahead of the people in its vision and thus which may help intensify and further the people’s struggle for their own liberation – can be developed. Thus, what we typically (perhaps crudely) call ‘critical theory’ is perennially required because, as Newton puts it, if there is no-one to ‘make the people aware of the tools and methods of liberation, there will be no means by which the people can mobilize’ for their interests (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 15); however, such critical theorizing will only be ‘accepted as valid’ by its ultimate target if it not only ‘delivers a true understanding of the phenomena which affect the lives of the people’, but moreover reflects and nurtures what the people as they currently are, are currently willing to contribute to the practical resolution of social contradictions; only this marks a truly vanguard thinking, or what Newton calls a ‘philosophy which will help orient us toward goals which are in the true interests of the people’ (pp. 58–59).

One might say, then, that what Newton is suggesting is that ‘critical theory’ is in fact better understood as a collection of competing hypotheses concerning both the contradictions that determine social life and the modes of their redress. As in empirical science, such hypotheses are developed out of limited evidence, and thus are often highly speculative or diverge in sharply contrasting ways, and before confirmation have the tendency of forming into competing, sometimes quite rigid and dogmatic schools of thought; consequently, these hypotheses, much like scientific ones, can only really become theories by testing them against the relevant data set, which in the case of revolutionary or emancipatory thought can only be the people themselves, who will decide whether it reflects or guides their struggle to collectively determine their own interests by mobilizing themselves to transform their immediately lived situation. While he does not quite put things this bluntly, this is one way of grasping the following passage from his famous speech on BPP ideology delivered to students at Boston College:

I would like to give you a framework or a process of thinking that might help us solve the problems and the contradictions that exist today. Before we approach the problem we must get a clear picture of what is really going on; a clear image divorced from the attitudes and emotions that we usually project into a situation. We must be as objective as possible without accepting dogma, letting the facts speak for themselves. But we will not remain totally objective; we will become subjective in the application of the knowledge received from the external world. We will use the scientific method to acquire this knowledge, but we will openly acknowledge our ultimate subjectivity. Once we apply knowledge in order to will a certain outcome our objectivity ends and our subjectivity begins. We call this integrating theory and practice, and this is what the Black Panther Party is all about. (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 23)

This suggests that, if the goal of political theorizing is, as Newton suggests, ‘to increase our [collective] ability to deal with [the real] world and shape its development’ in a progressive manner (Newton et al., 2004: 26), then it must be as open to critique, challenge, and revision in the light of its social reception as work in the empirical sciences is in light of experimental evidence. This, at least, seems to be how Chicago chapter Chairman Fred Hampton understood the nature of the BPP’s legendary breakfast program:

Our Breakfast for Children program is feeding a lot of children and [so] the people understand our Breakfast for Children program. We sayin’ something like this – we sayin’ that theory’s cool, but theory with no practice ain’t shit. You’ve got to have both of them – the two go together. We have a theory about feeding kids free. What’d we do? We put it into practice. That’s how people learn. A lot of people don’t know how serious this thing is … What are we doing? … we are running it in a socialistic manner. People came and took our program, saw it in a socialistic fashion not even knowing it was socialism. People are gonna take our program and tell us to go on to a higher level. They gonna take the program and work it in a socialistic manner … We been educating [them], not by reading matter, but through observation and participation. By letting [them] come and work in our program. Not theory and theory alone, but theory and practice. The two go together … This is what the Black Panther Party is about. (Hampton, 1970: 139, emphases added)

Theorizing the emancipation of the people is thus incompatible with the cultist drive to compel them – say, through the pressures of social shame or physical threat – to accept independently developed conclusions, for this effectively amounts to replacing their current masters with self-proclaimed superior ones; as Newton continually reminds us, ‘this is something we have to make quite clear: eliminating the controller and assuming the place of the controller are two different things’ (Newton et al., 2004: 101). While theorists from the academy and elsewhere can and should play a vital role in both social critique and pragmatic organizing, they can do so only if they accept that ‘we can’t jump from A to Z, we have to go through all of the development [because] the people tend not to take [even] one step higher; they take half a step higher … this is how we move to higher levels’ (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 71). The job of vanguard theory, then, is essentially to ‘find out what the people will do and [determine ways to] get them to do that much’ (p. 141).

Newton’s own concept of ‘revolutionary intercommunalism’ arose from his conviction that sweeping technological change and global economic integration have ensured that ‘nations no longer exist. Nor … will they ever exist again’ (Newton et al., 2004: 31). This, he hypothesized, necessitated a break with the cultural revolution favoured by the nationalists, because it is no longer possible for Europe’s former ‘colonies [to] decolonize and return to their original existence as nations’; it also meant abandoning the revolutionary internationalism favoured by the socialists because, in his view, American empire had ‘transformed itself into a power controlling all the lands and people’ across the globe. Because nations had effectively been rendered obsolete, Newton argued that ‘the world today is [best understood as] a dispersed collection of communities’, which he defined as ‘a small unit with a comprehensive collection of institutions that exist to serve a small group of people’, although the enduring influence of varied forms of chauvinism ensured that such communities typically (although not exclusively or essentially) were often differentiated and/or interconnected by ethnic or racial identity. Newton’s hypothesis, then, implied an experimental practice of ‘organizing … Black and [other] oppressed communities’, both along and across communal lines, with an eye towards the progressive seizure of local political institutions, as well as the creation of independently organized and staffed ‘people’s institutions’ in order to ‘meet the needs of the community until we can all move to change the social conditions that make it impossible for the people to afford the things they need and desire’ (Hilliard, 2008: 3). The BPP’s famous ‘service to the people’ programs can thus be read as Newton’s own efforts to confirm his intercommunal hypothesis, with the most forceful evidence arising in the incredibly potent Rainbow Coalition formed by the Chicago chapter along with the Puerto Rican Young Lords, the white ‘hillbilly’ Young Patriots, and other community-specific vanguard parties.7

While Newton’s central theoretical concept has recently begun to attract the attention of sympathetic scholars (e.g. Narayan, 2019), a critical assessment of it obviously lies outside the purview of this article; as does a response to the numerous critiques of the BPP’s lapses in translating intercommunal theory into organizational practice made not only by scholars both hostile (Pearson, 1996) and sympathetic (Henderson, 1997), but by some rank and file Panthers, as well (Shakur, 1987). It is worth emphasizing, however, that, despite Newton’s own confidence in his hypothesis and bold predictions regarding the future its embrace might produce, he also intentionally and explicitly ‘left [his own political] program open-ended so that it could develop and people could identify with it’, as evinced by the fact that he began with very local, piecemeal, seemingly reformist actions that could only be sustained and directed through community involvement, thereby allowing the people in distinct communities to challenge, alter, or clarify his theses in an ongoing way (Newton and Morrison, 2009: 47). Intercommunalism was thus ‘not offered to them as a conclusion’ they must accept, but as a theoretical ‘vehicle to move them to a higher level’ of consciousness and action; one that was to be as informed by the theoretical vanguard as it was by their communal constituencies, as they mutually and continuously revised their shared theory and practice. Thus, while he frequently made clear that he did not like the internally contradictory reality of things, the slow development of progress, and the need for continual self-criticism of his ideas in light of their popular reception any better than his Leftist opponents, Newton argued that we ‘have to understand that most of the people are not ready for many of the things we talk about now’; consequently, even as they speculatively theorize in advance of the people, Newton – effectively summarizing his essential lesson for the academic Left – argues that the vanguard must strive to ensure that their work is never ‘too far ahead of the masses of people, too far ahead of their thinking’, so as not to alienate them from what is, of necessity, their own struggle (Newton et al., 2004: 46).

Conclusion: The Enduring Relevance of Newton’s Lessons for the Academic Left

My aim in this article has primarily been to highlight and justify the emphasis that Newton’s BPP placed on the need for would-be vanguard intellectuals to be continually and meaningfully responsible, precisely by being directly responsive, to a concrete and engaged constituency seeking its own emancipation: an emphasis, I would like to suggest briefly in closing, that actually aligns Newton with some recent critiques of the Panthers primarily grounded in the very different conception of the vanguard embraced by groups often understood to be furthering their legacy.

Adolph Reed has long argued that the

oppositional tendency in post-segregation black politics was hampered by its origin in black power ideology. Radicals – all along the spectrum, ranging from cultural nationalist to Stalinist Marxist – began from a stance that took the ‘black community’ as the central configuration of political interest and the source of critical agency … This formulation [presumes] the existence of a racial population that is organically integrated and that operates as a collective subject in pursuit of unitary interests [and thus treats] leaders or spokespersons … not so much representatives as pure embodiments of collective aspirations. (Reed, 1999: 134)

Effectively echoing Newton’s critiques of both black nationalists and white socialists for imposing their conceptions of authentic black interests onto an un-consulted populace – often grounded in a quite distinct and essentialist conception of ‘community’ – Reed claims that many contemporary radical thinkers and activists ‘simply do not see political differences among black people’ as being relevant to the analysis of, or struggle against, racial capitalism (Reed, 2000: 72). Guided more by the judgment of peers than by a confrontation with the conflicted, messier, and more pressing concerns and interests expressed by the actual consistencies under discussion, ‘the substance of [such] political theorizing [has become] a hermetic exercise in sketching a utopian alternative to current social relations’ reflective of the distance theorists enjoy from them; the result, Reed argues, has been an often hostile and demobilizing ‘debate within and between these tendencies’ that ‘centred more on … internal consistency than on apparent fit with the facts of an external, lived world or verifiably demonstrable capacities for intervening in it’ in ways that either further the interests or increase the political capacity of the actual and diverse communities meant to be liberated through them (Reed, 1999: 7).

Recent work by Cedric Johnson traces with exacting historical detail how ‘the ‘two line struggle’ between black nationalists and Marxists descended into parochialism’ (Johnson, 2007: 155) as the 1960s passed into the era of reaction, bolstering Reed’s (1999: 136) claim that for ‘both camps [it was] concern with the internal consistency of the global narrative [that] drove the elaboration of ideological positions’ regarding a presumed black community, ensuring that ‘neither Marxists nor nationalists offered programs with demonstrable payoffs comparable to those promised by mainstream politicians’ to the communities in whose name both camps claimed to speak. This tendency, Johnson (2007) claims, led theorists and many activists away from the kind of responsive social organizing which I have tried to show was key to the BPP’s theory and praxis, and into a ‘mid-seventies turn to ideological education’ based on the ‘detrimental assumption that ideological clarity must precede political work and that familiarity with the radical canon’ of texts and/or correct ideas ‘is a prerequisite to meaningful participation in social life’; and, as Johnson notes, ‘such education programs … tend … to privilege intellectuals in relation to nonelite participants’, replacing a vanguard answerable to a specific constituency with varied forms of brokerage politics where (largely self-proclaimed) elite representatives of subaltern groups speak in their name, rather than helping to facilitate the economic and political self-determination of marginalized communities (p. 163, emphases added).

As ‘radical theory’ has become increasingly ‘disconnected from positive social action’, both Johnson and Reed suggest that ‘radical imagery [has been] cut loose from standards of success or failure’ (Reed, 1999: 141) that tie it to the world of concrete organizing, leading to a kind of retreat into ‘slogans and anachronistic analogies’, or ‘potted rhetoric that asserts [the activists’] bona fides, without concern for communicating outside the ranks of believers’ (Reed, 2000: 194–195); that is, the post-1960s trends in theorizing about economically and socially marginalized constituencies have effectively removed any material

restraint on those radical tendencies’ flight into idealism because claiming [to know, speak for, or distantly support] such a base obviated two key practical tests of theories and strategies as explanations and mechanisms of mobilization: (1) whether they can persuade a significant number of actual members of specific populations targeted for mobilization, and (2) whether they can guide action efficaciously. (Reed, 1999: 17–18)

Conversely, because they have become disconnected from a genuine vanguard, long-suffering communities have become increasingly less engaged with progressive politics, strategic coalitions, and mass mobilization, and increasingly resign themselves to the limited options for advancement that remain within the current alignment, alternately embracing neoliberal or Right-populist solutions to the enduring problems of racial and economic inequality. Both Reed and Johnson have thus been sharply critical of modes of ‘contemporary organizing’ grounded in ‘the notion of black exceptionalism’, or the ‘insistence upon the uniqueness of the black predicament and on the need for race-specific remedies’ (Johnson, 2017), and have criticized, for example, the hegemonic role played by the Black Lives Matter organization on the contemporary Left, for ‘assuming a rather simplistic view of black people’s ambitions and interests and drawing a false dividing line between the interests of black and non-blacks’.

However, despite the obvious resonances between their shared critique of intellectual vanguards and the one explicated above, because both theorists hold that this view ‘descends from Black Power thinking [in that it] presumes a commonality of interest among blacks and claims [elite] authority to speak on behalf of those interests’, both credit Newton and the BPP with inspiring this transition, rather than – as we have seen above – presciently warning against its omnipresent danger and deleterious consequences. While Johnson acknowledges that the BPP ‘represented a more revolutionary alternative to the more conservative black ethnic politics’ of cultural nationalism, he nevertheless holds that their ‘embrace … of black exceptionalism abided by [many of] the same logics’ that dominate current theorizing and activism surrounding black liberation; thus, in challenging the hegemonic discourse of racial exceptionalism, he simultaneously calls for a turn away from the BPP model of organizing and from a ‘nostalgia’ for their era of influence, most vociferously in an article entitled ‘The Panthers Can’t Save Us Now’ (Johnson, 2017). Reed is even less sympathetic with Newton’s legacy, for he sees the (as we have seen above, quite fraught) example of ‘the Students for a Democratic Society’s 1969 proclamation of the Black Panther party as the “vanguard of the black revolution”’ as reflective of the ‘distortion of political judgment into a search for authenticity, hauntingly like white youth’s quest in the 1960s for the most “authentic” blues’; on the largely white, academic-led Left, he identifies a longstanding trend towards political ‘exoticism’ that eschews concrete political analysis and organizing in favor of ‘thin and simplistic definitions of good guys and bad, “true” leaders and false’ (Reed, 2000: 71–73), with ‘approved’ black spokespersons featuring prominently in the former role. It is thus in large measure the white Left’s ongoing embrace of ‘Pantherphile exoticism’ (p. 71) that grounds Reed’s dismissive view that the BPP ‘added [little more than] props and uniforms to make radical politics entirely a show business proposition’ (Reed, 1999: 72). Neither theorist, however, attends to the strong tensions between the BPP and the purported vanguards of black culturalist and white socialist resistance of their time; tensions that ultimately and tragically revealed the dangers inherent in their divergent, but similarly Manichean, worldviews.

While the BPP faced surveillance, harassment arrests, and other forms of police brutality from their inception, the first lethal violence they suffered came in early 1969, when cultural nationalists from the US organization8 (most likely at the instigation of the FBI, but in direct response to Newton’s harsh criticisms of their political program) murdered Panther representatives Bunchy Carter and John Huggins during a conflict over the newly created University of California Black Studies program, in which US sought to control the program’s hires and content, while the Panthers pushed for involving the local, off-campus community at all stages of decision-making.9 Shortly thereafter, an SDS splinter group that called itself the Weather Underground – once again, over the strenuous objections of local Panther leadership – staged the ‘Days of Rage’, which mainly consisted of vandalizing lower-middle-class areas of Chicago in an effort to ‘bring the war home’; an action that was exploited by local police to help secure the warrant that led to the state assassination of Rainbow Coalition founder Fred Hampton.10 There could hardly be starker demonstrations of the intrinsic dangers of the flunkeyism that always arises when one seeks to instruct, rather than serve the people, or confuses one’s own speculative theorizing for their authentic will.

An assessment of their critique of the contemporary Left obviously lies beyond the scope of this article; however, if Johnson is correct to claim not only that ‘black ethnic politics has reached its ends or limits as an effective set of political practices’, but, moreover, ‘that the ends or aims of contemporary African American politics must become radically democratic in form and aspirations’ (Johnson, 2007: 218), and if Reed (1999: 50–51) is correct in arguing that

encouraging popular participation is the only effective possibility for reinvigorating a progressive movement in black political life because people respond by organizing themselves when offered concrete visions that connect with their lives as they experience them, not to ideological abstractions or generic agendas that perfume narrow class programs,

then the problem is how we move from a political landscape fragmented by both the rhetoric and reality of racial division into a coalition of movements capable of effecting the transformations necessary to overcome such division, as well as the class repression that requires it; this is, of course, the very problem with which Newton struggled throughout his active career, and while his answers remain somewhat speculative, his practical efforts to confirm them through the BPP’s service programs and unique brand of coalition politics bore undeniable, considerable, and suggestive fruit. Revolutionary intercommunalism may thus be of great aid in theorizing and organizing our way through the current impasse, and remains, in my view, a hypothesis deserving of further testing; but, regardless, I hope to have shown that Newton and the BPP should be grasped as essential resources as we seek to close the seemingly widening gap between theory and practice, or more precisely, between theorists and the people. At the very least, their history and legacy serve as stark reminders of the need to continually work to ground our necessary – but necessarily speculative – theorizing in the understanding that ‘dropouts understand things students don’t’ (Newton et al., 2004: 85).

### 1NC – Kritik

#### The 1ac’s resistance is framed by its imagination of a realm of discourse or knowledge that adheres to the form of given economies of desire. The aff is powerful precisely because it depicts a master who has access to certain privileges over subjects who are denied. However, desire organized thusly resists a master, without resisting mastery, and thus subscribes to a futile but nonetheless teleological project of overcoming the lack.

Rogers 15. Juliet Brough Rogers, professor of political science at the University of Melbourne (Australia), “A Stranger Politics: Resistance in Psychoanalytic Thought and Praxis” in Jacques Lacan: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Routledge, 2015: 186

The conundrum of change in psychoanalysis (and beyond) highlights the first of two particular problems of, and with, resistance that appear when the subject attempts such a change of rules. First, change rarely (if ever) involves the creation of what Douzinas (2013: 141) calls ‘a new political subject’. That is, subjects are always already subjected – let us say occupied – a priori and thus all imaginations of resistance are framed in a priori discourse. As such, the subjects’ imaginations, including their imaginations of the results of revolution – or of a new mode of being – are always colonized with what is available to them. This is why – for Žižek (2007) and for Lacan (2007) – in post-revolutionary states, what the subject will get is more of the same. The second problematic that haunts acts of resistance, and of more specific concern to psychoanalytic practice, is that any employment of violence as a means to an end, and particularly as an effort toward a violent unsettling of the regime, can only be understood as the effort to capture a definitive answer to the insistent and formative question to the Other, expressed by Lacan (2006) as,‘che vuoi Autre?’ – ‘what do you want from me?’ In some cases this may be a violent effort toward capture, exercised to the point of a defiance of the existence of the question. What this means is that one acts, violently, in order to produce a known future, as the answer. The two problematics of resistance overlap because the answer is always imagined in the terms/signifiers available from the past. That is, the answer appears in the frame of the categories which produce the subject, and thus recruits the first problematic: ‘you are (always) already subjected’. I’ll tackle these problematics in turn. First, ‘you are already subjected’. If we even partially accept Judith Butler’s (1997: 6) treatise on the formation of subjectivity as a series of ‘passionate attachments’ to ‘subjection’,10 then it is difficult to understand how the subject might be what Douzinas (2014) described as ‘re- or de-subjectivised’ in the first site of becoming a resisting subject.11 For the political subject of democracy, recognition is, as Claude Lefort (1989) has told us well, the condition of being a subject. This means recognition within the signifiers – let us call them biopolitical categories – allocated to the identity of the subject of democracy. The stage of political recognition is populated by signifiers which broker little dissent – by others and even by the self. In Butler’s terms, we are ‘passionately attached’ to our gender, imaginations of health, rights, and, in Lacan’s terms, the ‘goods’ – as objects and as ideas – which offer us the imagination of recognition. We are occupied as subjects through our own occupation with a recognizable identity before democracy, with the qualities (objects) that reflect that identity. This occupation allows for little, if any, dissent as to the naturalness, goodness, and reality of the signifiers that produce the subject – as signifiers which adhere fundamentally to economies of desires: as desires for recognition of identity and rights, as desires for capital. That is, the subject is occupied a priori with these categories and recognizes (and demands recognition) via these categories. If we accept the premises of subjection framed above then the argument follows that the resisting subject is still a subject, but one who looks for recognition beyond the common political forms. That is, we can say that the resisting subject is still ‘passionately attached’ to the ideas and objects which offer recognition, but these may be recognition by an alternative political party, a Cause or, in Lacanian psy- choanalysis, we would say s/he attaches to (another) Master’s discourse. They may resist one Master, but they chose another Master. They do not resist mastery. And here we have the basic difficulty with theories and actions of resistance. These difficulties are that somehow, in some way, any acts of resistance always become modes of, in Lacan’s terms, the desire for (another) Master (2007). Resistance, understood this way, is a state of being that is always already subjectivized within the parameters of its own claims, or within the parameters of the subject’s imagination of its goals. This is the obvious reference made by Lacan in his comments to the students who participated in the ‘resistances’ of 1968 in France (and elsewhere). As he says, ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a Master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007: 207).14 The provocative comment to the students – some of whom have come to listen to him and some who have come to (apparently) resist him – is a comment on their acting out the discourse of the Master that they imagine they can overcome, through listening (or even objecting) to another Master, namely, Lacan. In this attempt at resistance which falls prey to its own conditions of subjection, we can say that the subjectivity of the resisting subject – the student – is preoccupied with the signifiers available to resist, where the best they can hope for is to be re-occupied by the imagination of securing (another) truth. This hope, at least for the students in France at this time – understood through Lacan (and his discussions in 1969) – is the hope for the Other’s knowledge. A knowledge which the subject presumes the Other has. A knowledge which is imagined to be able to be accessed and had. A knowledge which is presented as the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’ And here appears the second psychoanalytic concern with resistance: resistance as a belief in an access to an answer, or, in its most extreme or crude terms, resistance as psychosis. Resistance, understood as a desire for a Master, becomes a performance of what the subject imagines is the answer. The answer as a closed course of action with a fixed teleological imagination, such that the resisting subject might say: ‘If I do this I will be this’, or ‘if I do this then the final result will be this’, or, in its psychotic form, ‘if I do this the world will be this’. It is important to stress, however, that this may not follow for all acts of resistance – which I will postulate later – but when Lacan says of the students in France that what they want is a Master, this form of psychotic achievement of an answer is precisely what he is referring to. Theirs is the desire for a discourse that holds within it the knowledge that the subject imagines is required (and can be acquired/obtained/had) to achieve a perfection of the signifier, an imagination that the subject can acquire, what Lacan (2007: 14–15) describes as the ‘Other’s jouissance’. The students, in Lacan’s suggestion, want to resist in order to obtain the answer when it is the existence of an answer at all they are supposedly resisting.

#### Their commitment to a politics of critique, disorientation, and interruption papers over the patriarchal economy of desire that forms the substrate of hegemonic politics. The ultimate function is to sustain the order of mastery that produces the conditions of possibility for imperialization

Lundberg 12 [Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, *Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric*, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175]

Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . . In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

#### We don’t need an alternative besides our framework of analysis – the fantasy will reveal itself as long as we continue asking questions to expose their concealment of the lack

Dean 6 [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *Zizek’s Politics,* Taylor & Francis: London and New York, 2006, p. xvii-xx]

By inserting popular culture into his writing, and himself into popular culture, Zizek enacts the way enjoyment colors or stains all thinking and acting. What this means, as I set out in detail in Chapter Three, is that there is a deep nonrational and libidinal nugget in even the most rational, formal ways of thinking. Again, it is not simply that popular culture is at the core of the theoretical enterprise of his books—it is that enjoyment is. Enjoyment is an unavoidable component of any philosophical effort (though many try to deny it). Zizek thus emphasizes the inevitable stain on philosophy, on thought, as he tries to demonstrate a way of thinking that breaks with (Zizek often uses Lacan's term traverses) the fantasy of "pure reason."

This leads to another key element of Zizek's thought: the possibility of taking the position of the excess. As I explain in discussions of his readings of St. Paul and Lenin, Zizek theorizes revolutionary politics as occurring through the occupation of this excessive place. Paul endeavors to put the Christian message to work, to establish new collectives beyond old oppositions between Greeks and Jews. Lenin also breaks with the given, arguing against all around him and against Marxist orthodoxy that the time for revolution is now, that it cannot be predicted, awaited, but must be accomplished with no assurances of success. Like Paul, he puts truth to work, organizing it in the form of a revolutionary political Party.

Zizek emphasizes that Lacan conceptualized this excessive place, this place without guarantees, in his formula for "the discourse of the analyst" (which I set out in Chapter Two). In psycho-analysis, the analyst just sits there, asking questions from time to time. She is some kind of object or cipher onto which the analysand transfers love, desire, aggression, and knowledge. The analysand, in other words, proceeds through analysis by positing the analyst as someone who knows exactly what is wrong with him and exactly what he should do to get rid of his symptom and get better. But, really, the analyst does not know. Moreover, the analyst steadfastly refuses to provide the analysand with any answers whatsoever. No ideals, no moral certainty, no goals, no choices. Nothing. This is what makes the analyst so traumatic, Zizek explains, the fact that she refuses to establish a law or set a limit, that she does not function as some kind of new master.7 Analysis is over when the analysand accepts that the analyst does not know, that there is not any secret meaning or explanation, and then takes responsibility for getting on with his life. The challenge for the analysand, then, is freedom, autonomously determining his own limits, directly assuming his own enjoyment. So, again, the position of the analyst is in this excessive place as an object through which the analysand works through the analytical process.

Why is the analyst necessary in the first place? If she is not going to tell the analysand what to do, how he should be living, then why does he not save his money, skip the whole process, and figure out things for himself? There are two basic answers. First, the analysand is not self-transparent. He is a stranger to himself, a decentered agent "struggling with a foreign kernel."8 What is more likely than self-understanding, is self-misunderstanding, that is, one's fundamental misperception of one's own condition. Becoming aware of this misperception, grappling with it, is the work of analysis. Accordingly, second, the analyst is that external agent or position that gives a new form to our activity. Saying things out loud, presenting them to another, and confronting them in front of this external position concretizes and arranges our thoughts and activities in a different way, a way that is more difficult to escape or avoid. The analyst then provides a form through which we acquire a perspective on and a relation to our selves.

Paul's Christian collectives and Lenin's revolutionary Party are, for Zizek, similarly formal arrangements, forms "for a new type of knowledge linked to a collective political subject."9 Each provides an external perspective on our activities, a way to concretize and organize our spontaneous experiences. More strongly put, a political Party is necessary precisely because politics is not given; it does not arise naturally or organically out of the multiplicity of immanent flows and affects but has to be produced, arranged, and constructed out of these flows in light of something larger.

In my view, when Zizek draws on popular culture and inserts himself into this culture, he is taking the position of an object of enjoyment, an excessive object that cannot easily be recuperated or assimilated. This excessive position is that of the analyst as well as that of the Party. Reading Zizek as occupying the position of the analyst tells us that it is wrong to expect Zizek to tell us what to do, to provide an ultimate solution or direction through which to solve all the world's problems. The analyst does not provide the analysand with ideals and goals; instead, he occupies the place of an object in relation to which we work these out for ourselves. In adopting the position of the analyst, Zizek is also practicing what he refers to as "Bartleby politics," a politics rooted in a kind of refusal wherein the subject turns itself into a disruptive (of our peace of mind!) violently passive object who says, "I would prefer not to."10 Thus, to my mind, becoming preoccupied with Zizek's style is like becoming preoccupied with what one's analyst is wearing. Why such a preoccupation? How is this preoccupation enabling us to avoid confronting the truth of our desire, our own investments in enjoyment? How is complaining that Zizek (or the analyst) will not tell us what to do a way that we avoid trying to figure this out for ourselves?11

### 1NC – Case

#### 1---Vote neg on presumption---

#### a---Pornotroping---the 1AC speaks on instances of violence against black people without any material way to solve it---that makes the violence fungible, which turns case

#### b---This is offense. Symbolically affirming their method without ties to material resistance strengthens power.

Rigakos and Law, 9—Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University AND PhD, Legal Studies, Carleton University (George and Alexandra “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance,” Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they:

query why subversive ‘assertions of self’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227)

Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity.

Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class.

Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration:

[T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes. In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a risk society.

Risk theorists already understand that every administrative system has holes which can be exploited by those who learn about them. That is what makes governmentality work: the supposed governor is in turn governed – in part through the noncompliance of subjects (Foucault, 1991a; Rose and Miller, 1992). For example, where employees demonstrate unwillingness to embrace technological changes in the workplace, management consultants can create:

a point of entry, but also a ‘problem’ that their ‘packages’ are designed to resolve. … In short, consultants readily constitute certain forms of conduct as ‘resistance to technology’ as this gives them some purchase on its reform by identifying a space in which expertise can be brought to bear in the exercise of power. Resistance consequently plays the role of continuously provoking extensions, revisions and refinements of those same practices which it confronts. (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994: 80)

This appears to be a very different kind of resistance from that contemplated by Rubin, but perhaps not so different from that of the authors whom he and McCann and March critique: those whose analysis ends at the discursive production of noncompliance. Instead, the above account is of a resistance that almost invariably helps power to work better. A conclusion in the present day that ominously foreshadows the futuristic, dystopic risk assemblage described by Bogard (1996).

Another example of the ‘resolution’ of resistance proposed above is the institution of a tool library described by Shearing (2001: 204–5). In this parable, a business deals with the issue of tool theft on the part of workers by installing a ‘lending library’ of tools instead of engaging in vigorous prosecution and jeopardizing worker morale. While the parable is meant to indicate a difference between actuarial and more traditional (moral) forms of justice, it also demonstrates how an act that may be considered ‘resistant’ is incorporated without conflict into the workplace loss-prevention scheme – an eminently preferable, ‘forward-looking’ solution within the logic of risk management. The same is possible in the case of more discursive forms of resistance. If I do not see myself as a Guinness man, for example, market researchers will do their best to adapt Guinness to the way I do see myself (Miller and Rose, 1997). The end result, of course, is that I purchase the beer. As manifested in a form of justice (Shearing and Johnston, 2005), it always consolidates, tempers emotions, cools the analysis, reconciles factions, and always relentlessly moves forward, assimilating as it grows. In this sense, therefore, Bogard’s ‘social science fiction’ actually pre-supposes and logically extends Shearing’s (2001) rather cheery and benevolent rendering of risk thinking. In this context of governmentality theory – as self-described and lauded for its political non-prescription by its own pundits – the acts or attitudes described as resistant are, in the end, absorbed by those who govern. Resistance as an oppositional force – that pushes against or has the potential to take power – is theoretically and politically neutralized. In the neutralization process, power is reproduced.

So, along with McCann and March’s observations that everyday resistance adds little to our understanding of false consciousness and that it denies the role of material factors in shaping identity, we can add Rubin’s two main criticisms of everyday resistance: it relies on an inaccurate understanding of power, and acts of resistance which supposedly emancipate actually may reinforce domination. All four of these criticisms demand the same thing: to know what is really going on, to get an adequate grasp of the social.

#### c---Debatability---they provide no concrete or new strategy that hasn’t already been done---that makes them undebatable because we can never predict what the 2AC spin will be---proves all our t arguments because even if its possible to debate them, it is not plausible which also means that simply thinking the aff is a good idea is not enough

#### Using capitalist metaphors to describe social conditions reinforces corporatization of education and normalizes inequitable power structures.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### Their claim that “historical analysis” and liberal grammars “cannot deal with the illegibility and intrinsic loss that is non-human-humanity” is wrong.

Doyle, 12—PhD candidate, Northeastern University (Benjamin, “Practicing “Politics [from] Without [the] Proper Locus”: Strategic Intimacies and the Subject of Unfreedom in Frederick Douglass’ “Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself” (1845),” <https://benjaminjdoyle.wordpress.com/tag/saidiya-hartman/>, dml)

Scholars of the Slave Narrative have gained significant ground in locating and theorizing on the socially transformative potentialities of black (and white) resistance to the sustaining modes of racial Othering determining who will and will not be afforded recognition as a rights-bearing subject within both nineteenth-century culture and our current normative racial political climate. While there has been broad scholarly investment in identifying the subversive strategies and tactics employed by both enslaved and “free” black subjects, in and outside the genres of direct narration, to unsettle the exploitative and exclusionary political modes of White domination, such scholarly critical assessments have tended to measure the efficacy of these acts of political resistance through their associative distance from the spatial and ideological locus of the dominant culture’s ways of being and practice. In other words, the effort has been to seek out, and, therefore, define, what counts as a transformative counter-culture or counter-normative discourse as necessarily located and enacted from without rather than within the spaces of domination. This approach, however, has caused many scholars to struggle to conceive of the space of un-freedom (of enslavement or post-slavery subjugation) as anything other than a negative political zone. This paper takes a different approach in determining the politicity of the enslaved subject and the socially and ideologically transformative potentiality his/her position of unfreedom makes possible. That is, this paper asks what it would mean to propose a transfiguration of the “proper” (i.e., normative) locus of political practice. That is, how might a critical reimagining of the “proper” grounding of the practice of politics as necessarily within rather than without the space of unfreedom contribute to the ongoing critique of the historical development of the normative political frame, and the continued hegemony of its self-authorizing “language of persons, rights, and liberties” (Hartman 6)? That is, might we learn something about (from) black counter-cultural forms of political resistance in the nineteenth-century by reconceptualizing the “proper” scene of the political through a reconsideration of how acts of political self-making and “partaking” (Rancière) emerge primarily within rather than from without the space of un-freedom? If we were to reconceptualize the very meaning of freedom as always already the subject of freedom’s lack – i.e., if we were to reassert the position of the enslaved subject as the proper locus of political practice – what might we learn about transformational political thought, relation, and action? What if alterity, and the political subject’s very distance from rather than its recognition and authorization of rights by the normative politics proper, defined the political ideal? Might the vulnerable deliberative actions of enslaved subjects – who even under the seemingly unalterable conditions of strategic surveillance (“hyper visibility”) and torture, compose “networks of affiliation” and strategized counter-modes of micropolitical resistance and revolt (Hartman) – demonstrate a more effective, ethical transformational politics that would allow for the emergence of more productive forms of rights making?

In Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman explores in shocking detail the daily “terror” of white on black racial violence enacted on the plantation is figured as much within the “shocking spectacle” of physical, bodily mutilation – rape, whippings, starvation, labor – as within “those scenes in which terror [could] hardly be discerned––slaves dancing in the quarters, the outrageous darky antics of the minstrel stage, the constitution of humanity in slave law, and the fashioning of the self-possessed individual” (4). Hartman’s careful treatment of a wide range of nineteenth-century slave narratives reveals as well, however, that the “clandestine forms of resistance” by enslaved blacks “were central features of everyday practice” (50). Though Hartman’s assessment of the internal modes of black resistance acknowledges the “possibility” of their “subterranean political practices,” she concludes such acts were by and large ineffective given the violent opposition enslaved subjects faced. A critical point of Hartman’s analysis shaping her negative political interpretation of the transformative potential of black resistance within such “scenes of subjection” is her extended explanation of how black subjection occurred both inside and outside the site of enslavement. The actual rather than “promised” conditions of “freedom” facing emancipated blacks, as Hartman shows, is characterized by “the loophole of retreat––a space of freedom that is at the same time a space of captivity” (9). In other words, the minority few enslaved persons who were capable of acquiring freedom from bondage, either through emancipation or “stealing away,” encountered not liberty but yet another form of subjugation in the North. As Hartman argues was the case, as much during the period of slavery as in the post-emancipation stages of national reconstruction, legal and political emancipation merely “replac[ed] the whip with the compulsory contract and the collar with a guilty conscience” (6). Given the fact of sustaining forms of unfreedom, Hartman makes tellingly clear that scholars must “reconsider the meaning of freedom” itself, for as she argues, “[T]he encumbrances of emancipation and the fettered condition of the freed individual . . . cast doubt on the narrative of progress” founding nineteenth-century liberal democracy and determining the prevailing imagined reality and empty rhetoric of today’s American exceptionalism (10).

If liberation from the bodily enslavement does not necessarily lead to the institutional recognition of rights and humanity of blacks, then locating freedom, either in the North or the South, is a tricky matter. In his 1845 Narrative, Frederick Douglass underscores what Christina Sharpe has similarly characterized as the “incomplete movement from slavery to freedom” (4) when he speaks to the false promise of the Northward trajectory of freedom. Upon arriving in New York, Douglass relates he remained “a fugitive slave in a strange land,” in constant danger of being recaptured by the “legalized kidnappers” – the “merciless men-hunters” of the North (69-70). Unable to receive work due to the overt racism against blacks by white laborers, Douglas enacts a powerful argument that the North was a “wilderness” of “wild beasts” and he could trust neither white nor black with recognizing his freedom obtained. Whereas Hartman is concerned with the ways in which blacks remained unfree even outside the space of direct enslavement, Douglass, too, is concerned with the continued subjugation of those who remain in bondage in the South. According to both Douglass and Hartman’s accounts, literal freedom cannot be fully obtained because whites in the North as much as those in the South refuse to acknowledge the inhumanity of black subjugation, then a shift in consciousness regarding the very idea of freedom – and perhaps more importantly, who precisely has and has not the right to make claims for freedom – must occur. For Douglass, however, unlike Hartman, the ambiguousness of the spatial and conceptual locus of freedom holds strategic potential for enacting the rights of the enslaved subject. That is, Douglass calls upon his audience to recognize this ambiguity of freedom and, therefore, reconceptualize the very ideas of freedom and unfreedom by adopting a critical form of consciousness that repositions the enslaved as the political subject who bears the rights to freedom and, therefore, is the political ground for establishing the proper locus for the practice of a socially transformative politics that, necessarily, must be negotiated from within the space of unfreedom.

For Hartman, however, she explains she remains skeptical of the efficacy of such calls for the “subterranean ‘politics’ of the enslaved” because, as she argues, their politics and rights-making procedures lack a “proper locus” (50). “[T]he possibilities of [these forms of] practice” as being “a ‘kind of politics’ . . . outside the ‘political proper,’” Hartman objects, “leads me both to question the appropriateness of the political to this realm of practice and to reimagine the political in this context” (64). While I do not disagree with the spirit of Hartman’s characterization of the slave-subject’s ostensibly negative political status, I would argue the letter of her argument problematically grounds what it means exactly to say the enslaved lacks a “proper locus” for his/her political “practice.” Hartman rightly asserts that nineteenth-century black subjects, free and enslaved, were violently situated “formally outside the [‘proper’] space of politics.” As she explains, “Slaves are not consensual and willful actors, the state is not a vehicle for advancing their claims, they are not citizens, and their status as persons is contested” (65). It is true enslaved persons not only lacked recognition as political agents, as subjects who could make “legitimate” claims to institutions of state power for legal representation or civic inclusion, but their very natural right-to-life (i.e., to be recognized as human) were rendered unintelligible by the politics “proper” as normatively situated. It is for that reason, however, that I take issue with Hartman’s leading claim, “Slaves are not consensual and willful actors,” for to suggest that one’s political subjectivity is defined by a consensus is to mischaracterize what politics is at its very core. If this statement is to mean they did not consensually agree to their position of political alterity, then, yes, of course. Yet, to say they are not “willful actors” resisting the biopolitical strategies to strip the slave-subject of all sociopolitical agency and institutionally recognized rights – the unmaking of a political subject – is to oversimplify the motivating conditions of such acts of resistance to a politics of “bare life.” A political actor is not “willful” in his/her subjection, but if s/he recognizes the only recourse to freedom from subjection is to refuse to accept his/her externally determined status of un-freedom, s/he must do so willingly.

It is important to carefully attend to Hartman’s own political aims motivating her statement that “slaves are not consensual,” that is, she is positing with purpose that their condition as enslaved-subject makes clear the movement toward political action does not position the enslaved subject as the primary causal agent of his/her action (s/he is not willfully a slave) or in the determination of his/her particular “needs or desires,” as the claims-making emerging from within the space of enslavement can only reflect “needs and desires” as defined by the very fact of enslavement. However, it should be made clear that no political act is done willfully, at least not in the sense that it could occur outside the space of subjection and domination. If there is no external force bearing down on the politically Othered body, there is no need for him/her/them to contest the denial of rights through enacting them – i.e., there is no need for politics as there is no desire for external forms of self-recognition denied by the politics proper. No one agrees to subjection – if one does, it is not subjection. And if one’s political right to dissent is not recognized by a “proper” locus, his/her grounding for democratic claims-making against subjection are always-already authorized, as Lloyd Pratt has cogently stated, by this “lack” (48), even if the authorizing position taken is unable, as of yet, to transform the abstract rights into immediate legitimate action or more transformative ethical forms of social-subject relations outside the space of enslavement.

Jacques Rancière makes a compelling argument for how to locate the proper site of politics under these conditions of a sustained unsettling of the “sensible” world. “The essence of politics is dissensus,” Rancière contends, “It is the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself. Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another” (Dissensus 38). Following Rancière, Jason Frank argues in “Staging Dissensus: Frederick Douglass and ‘We the People,” most contemporary efforts to theorize the conditions under which the political subject emerges often begin with an “understanding of the people…as a unified subject,” whose “popular sovereignty” in democratic political processes is authorized by the “institutions that legally organize them” (210). Challenging this model, Frank looks to Rancière’s examination of the aesthetics of political practice to contend that such scholars who continually refer to the apparent primary position of external institution recognition in the determination of the political subject fail to address the ways in which the constitution of the subject as political body or being need not rely on institutional determinations nor the internalization of external institutionalized norms to authorize its “democratic claims-making.” Accordingly, Frank posits, the formation of a unified “we” often represents a “false unity.” Upsetting the normative constitution of the political subject within a politics proper is critical, therefore, for both Frank and Pratt in their treatments of Douglass’ politics. They rightly argue that to claim the space of consensus as the primary site of the formation of political subjectivity is problematic, for a postulated “we” indicates a self-sustaining ethos of solidarity that marks a moment of apolitical stasis rather than what Pratt maintains as the necessary “lack” of political recognition of the subject that determines the need that fuels the desire for the political subject’s emergence and his/her decisive action. In other words, what need is there for a political subject in a state of consensus, a scene without struggle, a world defined by stability and cohesion, where the integrity of the whole, and the norms that determine its shape, go unquestioned? Rather than consensus, following Rancière, Frank maintains across his reading of Frederick Douglass’ “constituent moment” in his “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July” address, political subjectification is “enacted” through a “staging of dissensus,” whereby the presence of “‘the part that has no part in the name of the whole’” is the source and subject of political activity, and it marks the emergence of the political agent who participates in a “struggle” of rights and recognition. Thus, Frank argues, this presence of “division” and “unsettlement” is what constitutes “the primary condition of the exercise of politics” – what begins with a fracturing of the collective ethos, leads to a contestation of rights, of responsibilities, of actions, and a need for an operation of political critique that opens up the possibility “for a new political subject’s emergence” (210-211).

In an effort to theorize the nature of transformative – i.e., nonnormative – political subjectification and practice as necessarily always already outside the “proper” field of politics, as this paper aims to do, I point to Pratt who rightly argues that if we understand “democracy’s warrant is a state of lack,” then, as he rightly asserts, “[A]lterity [can be] the only legitimate basis for political life” (48). Moreover, I would add there will always be a locus for enacting one’s right to political action, as there is never only one proper locus from which to ground one’s rights making, but there is always the normative proper and the non-normative proper locus of politics – and from whence you position your political practice will determine the transformational impact your sense of what is vs. what ought to be will have in the (re)ordering of the normative ways of being and practice. I believe this is an important point to acknowledge. It is critical to sustain an interrogation of the diverse ways in which people have historically been, and continue to be, refused recognition within the scene of “proper” (i.e., normative) politics, as Hartman rightly calls on her readership to do. However, to also continually challenge the very real ways in which acts of subversion occurring at the micropolitical level can unsettle the most seemingly intransigent macropolitical structures – i.e., to upset the sensible locus of a politics proper – especially those being enacted from within the space of unfreedom and without the authorization or recognition by the politics proper (i.e., normative), is to, however unwillingly, merely reify the perceived immutability of the dominating culture. In what follows I want to argue that “reimagining” the proper locus of politics from within the space of unfreedom is not only “possible” but if we look to the political strategy informing Douglass’ transformation politics – his poetics of dissensus – he makes a clear argument across his narrative autobiographies and public oratory that this transfiguration of the politics proper is critically necessary in the transformation of the order of society and culture.

But what exactly constitutes the reconfiguring of the proper locus of politics? On the one hand, it would seem that external recognition and authorization of the political subject’s rights is necessary. But who exactly counts in authorizing and recognizing these rights remains a bit more ambiguous. The recognition of rights, as Hartman sees it, must eventually occur from within the proper locus of the dominant culture’s political practice if the emancipation of blacks from enslavement and liberty from racial biopolitics is to ever be achieved. But if the denial of rights is occurring within the politics proper, how does the transformation occur internally? I would argue that a challenge to the racial politics structuring the collective ethos of the politics proper must happen from without the normative proper, an external process of reorganizing the proper site of political action as necessarily located within the space of unfreedom.

If politics is not itself the sign of freedom, nor should we fool ourselves into believing it as such, but is necessarily freedom’s lack – i.e., politics is the practice of unfreedom – then a politics is always a politics of the not yet, a sustained negotiation or critique of what “freedom” is vs. what it ought to be. As this paper will argue, the site of un-freedom – of bodily enslavement, legal subjugation, social alienation, fettered consciousness – where the very idea of freedom is put to task, constitutes the primary site of political action. The recognition of enslaved persons’ rights-making were de-authorized from without, as Hartman’s reading of the slaves’ ostensibly negative political status makes clear. However, it is against this racialized, white privileged, biopolitical strategy sustaining the denial of political participation, representation, and recognition of blacks inside and outside the space of enslavement that Frederick Douglass’ 1845 Narrative and 1855 “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July” address seek to transform, as this paper will argue, not by the assimilation of blacks into the “politics proper” that many scholars of Douglass problematically assert was the aim of his constitutionalism (Frank; Kohn), but by the reformation of the very means through which a “proper” (i.e., non-normative) politics ought to be enacted. To say this another way, it is not that Douglass desires solely a “politics of fulfillment” through the recognition of blacks’ right to political participation outside the space of enslavement (Gilroy), nor especially as merely a part within the given sociopolitical frame of White culture; rather, as I will demonstrate below, what Douglass makes clear in both his Narrative and his “Fourth of July” address is a call for a “politics of transfiguration,” the necessary prior stage of “making good” on the promise of freedom that demands recognition of the politicity of black political action within the very space of subjection and denial – the claims being made by enslaved blacks, as Douglass asserts, are the only proper claims that can be made regarding the conditions of injustice they face and of the redress they demand. Moreover, by positing a dual critique of liberalism’s fictions of freedom – where Douglass contends in both his Narrative and “Fourth of July” address that whites as well as blacks will remain, in fact, unfree as long as universal human freedom is being denied – Douglass repositions the “proper” site of political action as emerging from within the space of subjection and enslavement. That is, the very idea of freedom emerges within the scene of unfreedom and from within the critical consciousness of the unfree.

#### Monolithic assertions of Blackness are incorrect.

Reed, 12-27-21—Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania (Adolph, interviewed by Jason Myles and Pascal Robert, “Adolph Reed Jr. on race reductionism and liberational politics,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvYcl7xkD70>, 1:14:05-1:19:22, dml)

Well, there is no Black community. I mean, not like that. Not that comes fully formed and whole with an interest that can be imputed or that overrides all the discrete interests that are at play. And I think this is one of the problems with notions like Black freedom struggle and stuff like that, that there’s a lack of historical specificity that leads the radicals to posit the ideal constituency at a level of abstraction that doesn’t help you connect with actual people’s actual concerns.

And this is, I think, perfectly demonstrated in how radicals moved from generic Black Power radicalism and the warrants, like putting Black faces in previously all-white places and Black economic development stuff, to construct these three different variants of what I would argue are the same ontological fantasy. That’s why it’s called an ideology. Pan-Africanism, culturalism, and the scientific socialism that the new communists embraced.

Because in each case, the move was to withdraw from – And there was a comparable thing going on in SDS too, by the way, or coming out of SDS – But to withdraw from the plane of mundane struggle where people’s lives were played out. To go into the closet, basically, or the sanctuary, and develop some abstraction called an ideology, that in each case was understood to be like an internally consistent belief system. Like a religion, basically. That’s what they all were. And the politics that was warranted from each of these ideologies was in some way apocalyptic. So, when people used to talk about shit like when the revolution comes. Well, in the first place, that’s not the way stuff works. And granted, I was the last [inaudible] so what the hell, right, because they weren’t the only ones doing it.

So, what radicals saw was… We hit the streets like moonies, basically, or Jehovah’s Witnesses, or whoever the people are who go around and ring your doorbell. And by the way, it used to work back in the day, a long time ago, that when they rang your doorbell you’d just say, I’m Catholic, and they’d run away like they’d just seen Satan. But that apparently doesn’t work anymore.

But anyway. So what political action was considered to be was proselytizing the ideology, not trying to organize around concrete programs and undertakings that would make people’s lives better. And that brings us back into the thin and abstract character of the symbols of new radicalism. Like, you knew that you were a Panther because you had that beret and that jacket. You knew you were a Nationalist because you had the dashiki and a beard like Maulana Karenga, and you knew you were Pan-Africanist because you dressed like a loser.

But none of those had any concrete content. I know it felt like it to the radicals. The radicals felt that all this stuff was deeply meaningful. But only to congregants in the church and to competitors from those other two churches. And again, bourgeois politicians, both the elected type and the war on poverty type, or the rest of them, were able just to take advantage of that stuff because they had an institutional program to offer people.

So, I think, yeah. I think it’s correct that the radicals weren’t able to overcome the class character or the class forces that were shaping Black politics, but they weren’t able to overcome it because they never engaged with it. Because part of the deal was denying their existence. And see, that’s when you get constructs like, or odd notions of what class meant. It had more to do with behavioral and consumption preferences than with… And see, this takes back to the notion of racial authenticity as the basis for politics. Right?

#### Monopoly capitalism worsens racism and antitrust advocacy strengthens every angle of resistance.

Greer and Rice, 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Since the founding of the nation, people of color have been living an economic nightmare. People of color have persistently lagged behind white people in nearly every economic category, including employment, income, education, small-business ownership, home ownership, and asset-ownership. This is the result of the rise and reach of concentrated wealth and power, including monopoly power.

The Racial Wealth Gap

Economic racial disparities do not happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of centuries of systemic racism and have been built into the design of our economic system, which has created what we at Liberation in a Generation call the Oppression Economy. The Oppression Economy uses the racist tools of theft, exclusion, and 31 exploitation to strip wealth from people of color, so that the elite can build their wealth. In this Oppression Economy, racism is profitable, and it fuels a cycle of oppression 32 that depresses the economic vitality of people of color, suppresses our political power, and obstructs our ability to utilize democracy to change economic rules that make racism profitable in the first place.

Racial wealth inequality is the consequential disease caused by the Oppression Economy. Today, racial wealth inequality has reached astronomical levels and will continue to rise if nothing is done. Without drastic policy action it will take 228 years for average Black wealth and 84 years for average Latinx wealth to match the wealth that white households hold today. Further, if nothing is done—or we attempt to return 33 to “normal” and fail to distance racism34 after COVID-19—Black and Latinx wealth will reach zero sometime in the middle of this century. These disparities are driven by 35 36 two reinforcing phenomena connected to the issue of corporate concentration: 1) the systematic withholding of wealth from people of color and 2) the gross concentration of wealth held by the corporate elite.

Between 1983 and 2016, which coincides with the rise of corporate and monopoly power, average Black and Latinx wealth was dwarfed [outpaced] by the wealth accumulated by white households. In fact, average Black wealth decreased by more than 50 percent over this period. This is the result of a long history of economic oppression that has 37 actively blocked people of color from building wealth or has stripped their wealth through theft and predation. The beneficiaries and perpetrators of this ever-growing gap are the corporate elite who set the rules of the economy. The corporate elite’s actions have led to people of color being paid less for their labor and having to pay more for the basic necessities of life. Here are a few metrics that speak to this reality.

• Black, Indigenous, and Latinx women earn between 55 cents and 63 cents for every dollar earned by white men.38

• Low income people of color often pay a 10 percent poverty premium for essential goods and services.39

• Black and Latinx households are far more likely than white households to be unable to pay their monthly bills or cover unexpected expenses.40

• Black households are more likely to be denied mortgage credit and end up paying more when they are able to access credit.41

• Black households, in particular, suffer from a crippling debt burden composed of an array of predatory credit products (e.g., student, small-dollar, auto, and home loans).

The phenomenon fueling racial wealth inequality is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. Today, the wealthiest 400 people in the US hold more wealth ($3.2 trillion) than the entire Latinx population ($2.4 trillion)and 43 more than 70 percent of the Black population combined ($4.41 trillion). While the 44 average wealth of Black people has decreased since the 1980s (as cited earlier), the average wealth of those on Forbes’s list of the 400 wealthiest people increased from $600 million in 1982 (adjusted for inflation) to $8.0billion in 2020.. You might be 45 asking, what does the Forbes 400have to do with monopoly? Well, it is a who’s who of corporate monopolists.

The people on this list are some of the most egregious perpetrators of driving down wages, expanding income inequality, degrading the health of workers, desecrating the environment, fleecing consumers, perpetuating racial residential segregation, driving community disinvestment, avoiding taxes, and corrupting our democracy. These monopolists utilize ruthless business practices to perpetuate their unquenchable thirst for maximized profits and for control of major segments of the US economy—and people of color bear the brunt.

America’s Legacy of Racism Drives and Sustains Corporate Concentration

The confluence of monopoly power and racial inequality is not new. The construction of an economy that relies on unchecked capitalism to create the modern-day monopolist relies on the construction and maintenance of America’s racial caste system. The legacy of theft, exclusion, and exploitation of people of color by corporate monopolists has been with us since the founding of the nation. In fact, prior to the Civil War, southern plantation owners were the equivalent of the modern-day Fortune 500 monopolists. The Mississippi Valley had more millionaires per capita than anywhere in the country, making it the Silicon Valley of that period. Prior to the Civil War, the combined value of America’s approximately 4 million slaves was $3.5 billion, making it the largest single financial asset in the entire economy, bigger than all manufacturing and railroads combined.46

As the roots of this problem run deep and disproportionately impact people of color, so too must the solutions. Today’s corporate monopolies are built on the foundation of an economy that also stole land from Indigenous people through genocide and forced removal, and built a labor market on the bodies of enslaved Black people. Nothing in our economy is race-neutral, including our work to dismantle monopoly power and the racial wealth inequality it causes, so we must seek race-conscious solutions.

Scholars have developed a catalogue of research confirming what many people of color experience on a daily basis: Corporations have seized control of many aspects of our lives that were once intended to serve the public good over private sector interests. Examples include the growth of charter schools and for-profit colleges as an alternative to public schools; the growth of private health insurance and private hospitals; the growth of private prisons and paid services in prison, such as phone calls and health care. However, more research is needed that connects the economic conditions of people of color to the growth of monopoly power, a call to action we further explore in Section 6.

Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements

There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities.

To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48

Corporate monopolists, including big banks, big tech, and big pharma, are often primary opponents in the battles for bold, transformational movement priorities. For example, activists for bold environmental justice policies, such as the Green New Deal, have encountered strong opposition from fossil fuel monopolies, such as Exxon, Shell and BP; but also, Wall Street bank monopolies financing fossil fuel monopolies, in addition to other monopolies in the airline industry. In another example, Wall Street 49 monopolies have aggressively clashed with affordable housing advocates as their investments have displaced residents of color from their homes and businesses and have also gentrified communities of color from Harlem to Oakland and Detroit to New Orleans. Directly challenging the monopoly power of these corporations could prove to be a useful tactic for activists of color to further movement priorities.

#### Wynter’s theory prematurely discards valuable tools for emancipation at the first whiff of colonial association.

Meagher, 18—University of Connecticut (Thomas, “Maturity in a Human World: A Philosophical Study,” <https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8155&context=dissertations>, dml)

Of course, these reflections take as their point of departure not a universal and ahistoric form of patriarchy, misogyny, or sexism, but rather a historically particular form instantiated through Euro-modern colonialism (Wynter, 1990; Oyèwùmí, 1997; Lugones 2007). What is it at issue is not so much the intersection of standalone forms of racism and sexism, but rather their mutual co-constitution through an imperial and colonial matrix of power. Following Sylvia Wynter, we may then raise the issue that the problem of maturity may be linked to what she terms “the over-representation of Man as if it were the human” (2003). “Man” takes as its point of reference a white, European or Euro-American bourgeois male, a “global breadwinner” whose economic mastery is attributable not to illegitimate regimes of appropriation and exploitation but rather to Man’s intrinsic virtue. The modern episteme, Wynter contends, is premised on elevating Man to the status of an a priori ideal of humanity. A consequence is that modern forms of knowledge are shrouded in a logic of “biodicy” (Wynter, 2006), in which whatever ills humanity confronts can be attributed not to the misdeeds of Man but rather to the intrinsic lack of value to be found in those human beings who are not Man – women, people of color, the global poor, etc. As such, the imperative lurking behind Euro-modern conceptions of maturity, as well as their enshrinement and naturalization within Euro-modern institutions, may be not only “be a man” but simply “be Man.”

“Man,” of course, stands ambiguously at the heart of many modern discourses. On the one hand, “man” can be taken to refer explicitly and particularly to adult males. On the other hand, “man” and “mankind” are taken to refer to humanity in general, with similarly gendered pronouns and suffixes serving as generic referents. Feminist thought has long had to reckon with the ripe conditions for equivocation that this engenders, and Wynter and other thinkers confronting problems of racism and coloniality have gone further in establishing that for Euromodernity, “man” equivocates between references to all human beings and references merely to European peoples (and perhaps the occasional “honorary white”).

Yet receiving much less attention is another central ambiguity: if “man” has an equivocal relation to categories of race and gender, what of its relation to age and adulthood? If Euromodern discourses on man over-represent a racialized, gendered, classed subject as if it represented humanity writ large, is there a similar error in over-representing the adult as if it were all humanity? Clearly, it would be an error to say, for instance, that human rights are rights by virtue of one’s having attained adulthood; the “rights of man” often refer to rights that would appear to be the human rights of children as well as adults. Indeed, there may be some human rights that are distinctly owed to children – consider, for instance, S. Matthew Liao’s argument that children have a right to be loved (Liao, 2015). Yet here the issue of paternalism emerges, a source of recurring debates in Euro-modern thought due to its imbrication in colonial and patriarchal modes of power. If children have a right to have guardians, then the debate rages as to whether the child-like should likewise have some form of protectorate imposed upon them.

Here a critical response emerges: if paternalism functions as a Trojan horse for colonization and patriarchy, then perhaps it simply ought to be rejected wholesale. Hence, what if decolonizing values requires discarding the notion of maturity altogether? In other words, maturity is woven into the fabric Euro-modern values, and it is therefore a medium for the propagation of coloniality. Where efforts to value maturity are present, it seems, the valorization of “Man” and devalorization of women, people of color, etc. lurks in the shadows. If Wynter’s call is for “the human after Man,” then it might follow that what is needed is the achievement of the human after maturity.

b. The Problem of Naïve Decolonization

The notion that any values associated with colonialism or coloniality ought to be discarded, however, is fraught with problems. The apt metaphor here pertains to the folly of throwing babies out with the bathwater. Colonialism is an effort to instrumentalize land, people, culture, values, and knowledge; it invariably makes use of that which is valued prior to colonization. This is not to say that colonialism does not introduce new values of its own, but even where this is the case, colonialism often seeks to impose these through projects of cooptation that are established in reference to the values that precede them. In brief, the issue is that efforts to value maturity are by no means original or exclusive to Euro-modernity and coloniality.

Consider here Ifeanyi Menkiti’s contention (1984, 2004) that it is typical of African conceptions of personhood that one must mature in order to become a person. Full personhood is not a product of birth alone but is rather achieved through the acts and influences that make one meaningfully a member of a community. The claim, then, is not simply that it is better to be mature than not, but rather that a type of maturity is requisite to attain an ontological status of personhood: “passage through time helps create not only a qualitative difference between young and old, but also an ontologically significant one” (Menkiti, 2004: 325). The notion of maturity as bearing normative significance and even the notion of maturity as constitutive of the difference between those who are fully human and those who are not are not purely European or colonial inventions. This is not to say that Europe did not re-invent notions of maturity or bring to them a significance that was distinctly colonial and not indigenous to a pre-colonial context. Nor is it to claim that it was African societies’ normative attachment to forms of maturity that made them more susceptible to efforts of European colonization. The point is simply that maturity refers, ultimately, to ideals about which many societies have had constructive ideas prior to colonization, and the fact that there are colonial ideals of maturity, as well as precolonial conceptions of maturity that have been colonized and transformed in the process, does not imply that maturity ought to be discarded wholesale on the grounds that it is no more than a colonial artifact.

The effort to reject whatever is associated with colonizers or epochs of colonization can be termed “naïve decolonization.” I do not mean to suggest that decolonization is itself naïve but rather that one can distinguish between forms of decolonization that are naïve and forms that are mature. Naïve decolonization often works according to the logic of guilt by association. Under this framework, decolonization’s chief responsibility becomes to repudiate whatever happens to be associated with the csolonizers. The problem with such an approach is one that Aimé Césaire raised in Discourse on Colonialism (2000): that to oppose colonialism, to maintain that it dehumanizes both colonized and colonizer, does not mean that one can go back to a pre-colonial world. Frantz Fanon, likewise, issued the call to “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them” (1963: 311), but this “leaving” meant to refuse the claim that Europe was an adequate model, that its “successes” made it worthy of imitation. “It is a question,” Fanon wrote, “of the Third World starting a new history of Man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe’s crimes, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity” (1963: 315). In short, the imperative to build a world no longer suffering from colonial pathologies may require that one not discard all European thought in much the way that European intellectuals often claimed that all non-European thought could be discarded. Naïve decolonization regards repudiation of the colonial as sufficient for decolonization; mature decolonization confronts a responsibility to build a world that is genuinely after colonialism, a world, as Fanon called for, in which tools would not possess human beings and enslavement would be brought to a permanent end, and wherein it would be possible for human beings to discover and love each other, wherever they may be (1967a: 231).

In that sense, we may issue a warning that Wynter’s call for “the human, after Man” may not mean, as such, the death of Man. The obvious points of reference here are Michel Foucault’s vision that man could be erased “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1994: 387) and Friedrich Nietzsche’s “God is dead. … And we have killed him” (Nietzsche 2001: §125). The problem with a call for Man’s death is that the death of Man is not necessarily the end of Man’s power. That Man should have hegemonic power in shaping the world, in organizing it in such a fashion so that each of its part serves Man’s ends, is an acute concern. But the death of Man does not guarantee the diminishment of such power. Foucault had expressed a similar concern in warning that having literally cut off the king’s head does not ensure that one will have done likewise in the realm of political theory (Foucault, 1978: 88-9); the question can remain, though, as to whether even cutting off the king’s head in political theory would eradicate the king’s power over how politics is thought about. Here African ontologies suggest a relevant point of consideration: the death of ancestors does not eradicate their power with regard to present and future generations (Gyekye, 1995: 68–84; Henry, 2000: 26–43; L.R. Gordon, 2006: 58–61).

Wynter, in building off of and beyond Foucault’s framework, discussed these matters in terms of “transumptive chains” that govern the shift from one episteme and epoch of power to another. The symbols and modes of knowledge production put into effect to undergird one regime of power, do not “resume” so much as “transume” – that is, their interruption by revolutions and epistemic breaks yields their continuation in altered forms. The “death of God” at issue for Nietzsche and others was less an issue of God’s absence and more an issue of how God had been replaced; could science, philosophy, or Man really serve the knowledge- and world-orienting roles that God had? To ask of humanistic institutions that they replace God is, in its own way, a continuation of the power of God: it is to impose a demand that is exogenous to those institutions and that may transcend their capacities quite drastically. The degodding of the Western episteme, Wynter contends, moved it out of a Christocentric framework of knowledge production into a partially secularized episteme of Man-1, premised on the centrality and ideality of “homo politicus,” which in turn was further degodded and begot Man-2, the episteme of “homo oeconomicus” (Wynter, 2003, 2006). But the structure of the argument implies that present efforts toward decolonization could, simply, beget Man-3, and simply because one takes as one’s aim that one will kill Man-2 does not negate the possibility that one’s efforts will culminate in the hegemony of Man-3.

A further reference point of relevance, then, is Sigmund Freud’s notion of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1977: 207–8, 328–38). Human beings enter into a world in which they are cared for, but their maturation facilitates the diminution of that care. Confrontation with an adult world, though, may spark forms of resentment that engender an anxious or oppositional relation to those by whom one has been nurtured. The notion of the Oedipus complex suggests a desire to displace and replace those sources of care, and the structure of such desire would be to persist without reflective awareness: e.g., I want to spite my father by surpassing him and reincarnate my mother’s love through another, but I may fail to understand that this desire is implicitly manifest in my acts. The psychoanalyst, then, can point to the structural tendency of human existence to produce Oedipal desires, and for the patient under analysis, this can facilitate reflection on how one’s behavior may ultimately be the symbolic expression of the Oedipal. Fanon (1967a), though, by taking this method seriously, saw that a rigid interpretation of it would have to be transcended, for in a colonized society, the sociogenesis of Oedipal structures would be quite different than it would be in the European context that stimulated Freud’s explorations. If in both France and Martinique it was Man that was symbolically produced as paragon of value, then the investment of Oedipal desire in one’s father could be typical among white children in France and atypical among black children in Martinique. The tragic consequence is that many black people would, in turn, act upon these desires unreflectively, pursuing dreams of integration and white acceptance that were simply unrealizable. Hence, the Oedipal could, in the colonial context, be an extension of colonial power, part of the array of psychological tools that undergird domination. A further problem, then, is evident even in opposition to the colonizer: pursuing the death of the colonizer, to passionately seek the death of Man, could be to fail to confront the causes of one’s debilitation and, indeed, to exacerbate them.

Psychoanalysis hinges on the importance of moving from a naïve understanding of one’s desires to a mature one. Ironically, this point is often lost on many of those who repudiate Freudian psychoanalysis. Indeed, both in positivist and post-structuralist psychologies there is much evidence of an Oedipal relationship to Freud, an over-investment in, as it were, cutting off his head in psychological theory. This may take pathological expression where it means that one recapitulates the worst of Freud’s mistakes and discards his most prescient insights. An example is illustrated by Emma Perez’s criticism of Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze’s Anti-Oedipus. If Guattari and Deleuze are correct that the Oedipal does not arise in the pre-colonial kinship structures of the non-West, it does not thereby follow, Perez contends, that colonization has not imposed the Oedipal on them. To resist the Oedipal diagnosis, in short, does not combat the “Oedipalization” that coloniality puts into place (Perez, 1999: 102–110). The “anti-” of antiOedipus may, ultimately, betray an Oedipal anxiety at the heart of post-structuralist efforts to hasten the death of their forbears. So, too, for positivist approaches that, repelled by the limitations of the “talking cure” approach of psychoanalysis, beget an uncritical and at times fetishistic relationship to neurophysiological reductionism. That there are limitations to the early articulations of psychoanalysis does not entail that one ought to overlook its strengths, in the same way that the psychoanalyst may recommend that the patient respond to the influence of a flawed parent by at least attempting to grasp and understand the parent’s genuine virtues and accomplishments; otherwise, the disdain may become pathological. The point of examining structures of Oedipal desire is not to discover an inevitable fate – to find that one is doomed to pathology and catastrophe – but rather to help one take responsibility for reflecting upon what one really wants and needs and, to use Fanon’s term, to be actional in the face of powers one cannot fully eradicate.

What Fanon and Perez point to, then, is a model of mature decolonization for which the mere acceptance and application of European ideas and concepts is inadequate but for which the wholesale and uncritical repudiation of those ideas and concepts is undesirable and irresponsible. Hence, the maturity of decolonization involves heeding both Audre Lorde’s warning that it would be naïve to expect the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house (Lorde, 1984: 110–3) as well as Jane and Lewis Gordon’s warning that the effort to dismantle the master’s house is necessary but insufficient for projects of decolonization (Gordon and Gordon, 2006). The master is, indeed, well-versed in how to use his tools to maintain his house; for this reason, decolonization that limits itself to immanent critique of the Euro-modern intellectual canon is likely doomed to tilt at windmills, for this canon was by and large erected in order to facilitate enduring modes of coloniality. But the diminution of the master’s power is not merely a matter of dismantling his house, and tools that the master has sought to employ might nonetheless be useful to construct other houses, to create alternative possibilities and futures. In short, naïve decolonization takes its responsibilities as delimited by the need to overthrow the master, but mature decolonization encounters an expanded responsibility which demands the creative and critical apprehension of the resources and inventions that can build a new world and set afoot a new humanity. As such, it needs to be wary of naïve decolonization, for, among other issues, naïve decolonization is a tool that masters can manipulate, have manipulated, and may even at times appropriate as their own. Think, for instance, of the many ways in which the ideal of a color-blind society, offered up initially as an anti-colonial idea, has been turned into an asinine but effective tool for passing and upholding policies with racist effects, or the ways in which the expansion of U.S. colonial power drew upon exploitation of the so-called “Black Legend” to replace Spanish colonial power without eradicating the colonial standing of the locales thus “liberated.”

To speak of “naïve decolonization” at all, though, is to raise a thorny linguistic issue, for “naïve” shares its etymological roots with the term “native.” The notion that its articulation in modern French and English vernaculars is completely unrelated to conceptions of “natives” in the colonies strains credulity. To decolonize the concepts that shroud intellectual production and normative life requires critical reflection on the relationship between the concepts as inherited and the greater conceptual scheme of which they are parts. So, for instance, we may speak of the efforts of those like Kwasi Wiredu (1997: 136–144) or Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (1986) toward decolonization by way of rethinking concepts from the perspective of languages not imposed by colonizers and, indeed, to be able to think enmeshed in these languages rather than as a merely occasional visitor to them. But it does not follow that one is in all cases better off by having abandoned terms that appear in the language of the colonizer, and the imperative of crosscultural communication – both in general and in the particular case of projects of decolonization – may require being able to critically and reflectively employ language that is neither purely innocent nor purely colonizing in its pragmatic effects. “Naïve” may simply refer to a cultural universal with transcultural validity, whereas the peculiar sense of “native” in Euro-modern languages may be the cultural particular of a cultural formation guided by the telos of colonization.4 And where “naïve” is used in such a way as to implicate this “native” baggage, one need not throw one’s hands up and abandon the term, since the alternative of distinguishing better and worse uses of it remains.

## Block

### Case

#### Forwarding a material strategy is key---this links the t page to case through the Vernon evidence

Newton, 71 (Huey P. Newton, “Black Capitalism Reanalysed,” Huey P. Newton Reader 227- 228) \*gendered language modified\*

We see then that power has a dual character and that we cannot simply identify and define phenomena without acting, for to do so is to become an armchair philosopher. And when Bobby and I left Merritt College to organize brothers on the block we did so because the college students were too content to sit around and analyze without acting. On the other hand, power includes action, for it is making phenomena perform in the desired manner. But action without thinking and theory is also incorrect. If the social forces at work in the community have not been correctly analyzed and defined, how can you control them in such a way that they act in a desired manner? So the Black Panther Party has always merged theory and practice in such a way as to serve the true interests of the community. In merging theory with practice we recognized that it was necessary to develop a theory which was valid for more than one time and place. We wanted to develop a system of which was good anywhere, thus it had to be rather abstract. Yet our theory would relate to a concrete analysis of concrete conditions so that our actions would always be relevant and profitable to the people. Yet, at the same time, it had to advance their thinking so that they would move toward a transformation of their situation of exploitation and oppression. We have always insisted on good theory and good practice, but we have not always been successful in carrying this through. When the Black Panther Party defected from the Black community; we became, for a while, revolutionary cultists. One of the primary characteristics of a revolutionary cultist is that he despises everyone who has not reached his level of consciousness, or the level of consciousness that he thinks he has reached, instead of acting to bring the people to that level. In that way the revolutionary cultist becomes divided from the people, ~~he~~ [they] defects from the community. Instead of serving the people as a vanguard, ~~he~~[they] becomes a hero. Heroes engage in very courageous actions sometimes, and they often make great sacrifices, including the supreme sacrifice, but they are still isolated from the people. Their courageous actions and sacrifices do not lead the people to a higher level of consciousness, nor do they produce fundamental changes in the exploitation and oppression of the people. A vanguard, however, will guide the people onto higher levels of consciousness and in that way bring them to the point where they will take stemer actions in their own interests and against those who continue to oppress them. As I've said previously; revolution is a process, not a conclusion. A true revolutionist will not only take courageous actions, he will also try to advance the people in such a manner that they will transform their situation. That is, by delivering power to the people the true revolutionist will help them define the social phenomena in their community and lead them to the point where they will seize the time and make these phenomena act in a desired manner.

#### Race war is ahistorical and essentializes coalitional politics vital for positive transformation---choosing a side does NOT demand militancy.

Beaty and Raphael ’16 [Thalia and T.J.; July 11; Senior Producer for visual investigations at ProPublica; Digital Content Editor, citing Al Amin and Stanley Nelson; The Takeaway, “Is America Headed for a Race War?” <https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/takeaway/segments/story-race-and-violence-america>; RP]

The United States is still reeling from a week of racial tension and graphic violence, and while there is more than enough anger in America, some continue to fan the fire that has been lit under the summer of 2016.

Fox's Bill O'Reilly has insisted that “[white Americans despise](https://mediamatters.org/video/2016/07/08/o-reilly-instructs-naacp-director-and-african-americans-distance-themselves-black-lives-matter/211462)” the Black Lives Matter movement, and the head of the National Association of Police Organizations accused President Obama of being responsible for a “[War on Cops](http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/obama-war-on-cops-police-advocacy-group-225291).”

As tension continues to mount, some claim that we’re starting to see the beginning of a race war in America. But in reality, the narrative of racial warfare in the United States goes back two centuries.

In [a letter](http://www.nytimes.com/1865/04/21/news/murderer-mr-lincoln-extraordinary-letter-john-wilkes-booth-proof-that-he.html?pagewanted=all) he wrote before assassinating President Abraham Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth claimed that "this country was formed for the white, not for the black man" — a theme picked up by the KKK in its angry, murderous, and garbled calls for white power.

Back in 1967, black militants like [Jamil Abdullah Al Amin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H._Rap_Brown), formerly known as H. Rap Brown, also said that racial violence in the United States was unavoidable.

“I say violence is necessary," Al Amin [said](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=scYQGiybJbY) decades ago. "Violence is a part of America’s culture. It is as American as cherry pie. Americans taught the black people to be violent. We will use that violence to rid ourselves of oppression if necessary.”

And then there are [The Turner Diaries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Turner_Diaries) from 1978 — a novel about a race war started to prevent the government from suspending the Constitution. The book seemed to inspire Timothy McVeigh, who carried out the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995.

Just last week after the shooting in Dallas, Texas, former Illinois Congressman Joe Walsh [wrote](http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/joe-walsh-war-obama-black-lives-matter-dallas-article-1.2703883) on Twitter: "3 Dallas Cops killed, 7 wounded. This is now war. Watch out Obama. Watch out black lives matter punks. Real America is coming after you." He later [deleted](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-joe-walsh-twitter-dallas-tweet-20160708-story.html) that tweet and said he did not mean it as a call for violence.

Have we crossed a threshold in this country? Is the nation really evolving into a war zone, with battlefields popping up everywhere by surprise?

[Stanley Nelson](https://twitter.com/stanleynelson1), a documentary film director and MacArthur fellow who made documentary "[The Black Panthers: Vanguard of the Revolution](http://theblackpanthers.com/home/)," believes there’s a way forward out of this tension.

“I think that we may be on the edge of something good,” he says. “I think that people are looking at police violence and people are looking at racism in a different way than they were certainly [seeing things] even three days ago.”

The change in perception, Nelson says, can be linked to changing technology.

“The difference is that people have a camera in their pocket, and they’re able to film these things,” he says. “That’s what’s changed — the way we look at it — because we’re now able to see it and it’s impossible to deny.”

Though he does sense change, Nelson also says that there are no “clear, quick answers” to the questions surrounding racism, racial tension, police brutality, and gun violence in America.

“There’s a feeling that there’s a culture in the police department that has to change, and how do you change a culture?” he asks. “I think one of the most startling things that’s happened is that these killings have gone on in every sector of the country — it’s not just the south, the north, or the east. So what does that say about police departments?”

As tensions continue to simmer, Nelson says that it’s important for America to “speak honestly about what is going on.” However, such an exercise seems to be increasingly difficult as the 2016 election marches forward.

“Donald Trump has fanned the flames of racism in this country,” Nelson says. “He was a real driving force in the birther movement, and he started out his campaign by calling Mexicans rapists, and he’s called for banning Muslims from this country. There’s a feeling that we’re under attack, and at the same time, other Republicans are saying, ‘Yeah, that’s racist, but we’ll still support him.’ It’s very scary, I think, for African-Americans to look out and see that Donald Trump has over 50 percent of the white male vote.”

When comparing the racial struggles of the 1960s to the present, Nelson argues there are several similarities — similarities to be hopeful about.

“One thing that’s important to remember about the ‘60s is that it was a movement not only of African-Americans, but it was a movement of all people,” he says. “If you look at any of the huge marches, it’s not just black Americans, it’s white Americans, Asians, and Latinos — everybody is participating. And I think just as today, everybody’s outraged by what’s going on. I hope that we are at the start of a movement.”

While some claim that a race war is on the horizon, Nelson sees a future that joins together different groups.

“We’re at a place, hopefully, where change is something that people are thinking about, that black people, white people, Asians, Latinos — everybody in this country is thinking about how we get better,” he says. “That’s one of the things that the United States offers — the chance to get better.”

In order to see that things get better, Nelson argues that we must start viewing police brutality as human issue instead of a black or brown issue.

“I’m very heartened by young people,” he says. “When you look at these demonstrations that are taking place all over the country, it’s not just black people, it’s everybody who’s protesting. That’s what we have to understand — it has to be everybody who protests these police killings, which have gone on and on again for the last two years. Because of video cameras that we have in our pockets, we’ve seen evidence that this is really happening — irrefutable evidence. Before we could kind of pass it off.”

Rejecting calls for a race war and choosing a non-violent path forward is “the only way that you can win,” Nelson says.

“The very idea of the civil rights movement and non-violence was to say, ‘Look, look at what’s happening in the south — look at the dogs, look at the hoses. You have to pick a side,’” he says. “I think that’s maybe where we’re coming to now, and I think that’s maybe not a bad moment. Maybe it’s a moment of change.”

#### White militants crush solvency.

Cesca ’15 [Bob; August 19; Contributor; Salon, “Wing-nuts with guns & dreams of a race war: Inside the dangerous obsessions of right-wing extremists,” <https://www.salon.com/2015/08/19/wing_nuts_with_guns_dreams_of_a_race_war_inside_the_dangerous_obsessions_of_right_wing_extremists/>]

Even as we round the corner into the final year of the Obama administration, organized and semi-organized racists continue to rage against the election of the first African-American president. This Summer, their specified target is the Black Lives Matter movement, and the racist groups in question happen to be gun-toting Oath Keepers and Confederate flag fetishists.

Let's start with the Confederate flag crackpots. This past weekend, Confederate flag supporters, who insisted they totally aren't racists, trolled African-Americans in Sunrise, Florida. A group called the South Florida Rednecks launched a motorcycle convoy with their bikes and pickup trucks festooned in the Confederate flag, which is totally not inflammatory at all. But when Black Lives Matter protesters appeared, Raw Story [reported](http://www.rawstory.com/2015/08/confederate-flag-loving-bikers-wave-guns-and-knives-at-black-lives-matter-protesters-during-florida-rally/) that some of the Southern Florida Rednecks brandished knives and firearms, clearly to intimidate the protesters.

What makes the flag people particular volatile is the self-evident fact that they're an embattled and rapidly dying sub-faction of hate-mongers in deep denial about their archaic symbol of "heritage." (Heritage meaning slavery, treason, Jim Crow and southern racism.) And the louder they become, the tighter the walls close in around them -- which could further provoke them into snapping. Given how the most recent assault on the flag began with a mass shooting, it's reasonable to worry that it might not be the only time a Lost Cause-obsessed rebel lashes out at people of color, and given how the Black Lives Matter protesters are extremely visible now, it might benefit the flag rednecks gathered in organized rallies to set a few ground rules about protecting their dastardly heritage without the use of weapons.

Speaking of which, news broke during last week's anniversary of the shooting of Michael Brown that Oath Keepers appeared in Ferguson -- fully armed. By way of review, the Oath Keepers are considered a militia group affiliated with the patriot movement and composed of former military and law enforcement officials who've each pledged an oath to disobey any laws they deem to be in violation of their constitutional rights. (They sound hilarious at parties.) Who knows what the hell would've happened if a non-white group showed up armed with AR-15 semiautomatic rifles, given that Ferguson has seen more than its fair share of unarmed, peaceful protesters pepper-sprayed and incarcerated.

Late last week, Ferguson law enforcement ordered the Oath Keepers to stow their rifles while inside Ferguson city limits. However, on Monday, the head of St. Louis County's Oath Keepers chapter, Sam Andrews, [announced](http://www.rawstory.com/2015/08/oath-keepers-plan-to-arm-50-black-ferguson-demonstrators-with-ar-15-rifles-and-dare-cops-to-shoot/) that the group wants to arm 50 Black protesters as part of a political demonstration later this month, and announced their intention to deliberately provoke police officers.

Do we really need to outline what's going on here?

Throughout the history of the United States, there's always been talk about a forthcoming race war. In recent years, however, the existence of social media and the amplified shrieking of the conservative entertainment complex have combined to open a gaping window of legitimacy for both race wars and wars against the U.S. government, which is currently and not-insignificantly run by an African-American president.

By the way, I'm old enough to remember how there wasn't a peep from any of these maniacs during the Bush years. In fact, any anti-government rhetoric was vocally shouted down by Dixie Chicks-haters and Bush-supporters, who insisted that we should [never criticize](http://www.bobcesca.com/blog-archives/2009/03/convenient_patr.html) the commander-in-chief while troops were in harm's way. Hell, personalities like Bill Maher were summarily fired for daring to utter an off-handed criticism of our military leaders. Now, today, the same weirdos who were accusing Michael Moore or Nancy Pelosi of being unpatriotic for not supporting the Iraq War are rending garments over the Jade Helm "conspiracy" and a military takeover of Texas.

Worse yet, an incendiary Venn diagram of Confederate flag suppoerters, armed Oath Keepers, and members of the Alex Jones conspiracy theory goon squad appear to be forming a perfect storm that's hastily moving closer to African American activists, chiefly Black Lives Matter protesters. It's becoming increasingly evident that right-wing extremists and militia radicals are determined to touch off some sort of violent conflict involving black activists and law enforcement, with Black protesters as either targets or as convenient patsies.

With the radicalization of the far-right, especially during the last six years, the eliminationist rhetoric that jet-blasts around the clock from Fox News Channel, AM talk radio and various social media groups has begun to turn a corner. Now they are actively trying to foment mass armed confrontations.

Now, it’s entirely possible the Oath Keepers will either be prevented by law enforcement from handing out firearms to protesters, or it could be that it’s all a big bluff, that none of the Ferguson protesters have even the remotest of interest in participating in this Oath Keeper protest. But what matters here is the intention. And the intention is to incite violence, in an already tense atmosphere, by a right-wing hate group that has zero interest in the future of civil rights -- or black lives, for that matter.

#### “Race War” rhetoric is co-opted – intensifies Klan violence

Saletan 16 William Saletan, writer for Slate, Harvard Grad, There Is a War Over Race in America: But it’s not whites vs. blacks. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/07/there-is-a-war-over-race-in-america-but-its-not-whites-vs-blacks.html

Hours after a sniper gunned down five law enforcement officers in Dallas—claiming, according to police, that “he wanted to kill white people, especially white officers”—no one was crowing louder than David Duke. “All I warned about, sorry to say, is now happening,” the former Klansman tweeted. “There is war against Whites in America. A war of hate, racism, and violence against us!” Duke circulated tweets by people who used the phrase “black lives matter” and celebrated the shootings. In a pitch to Donald Trump supporters, he added the hashtags #WarOnWhites, #ThanksObama, and #MakeAmericaGreatAgain.

**This is the central thing to understand** about what happened in Dallas: **Black people who target whites are fundamentally allied with white people who target blacks**. They’re on the same team: the race war team. It’s a lot like the global struggle over jihadism, in which Muslims who hate Christians collaborate, in effect, with Christians who hate Muslims. In the case of jihadism, the real struggle **isn’t between two religions. It’s between people who want religious war and people who don’t**. The same is true of race: **Either you’re on the race war team, or you’re against it.**

The attack in Dallas—allegedly committed by Micah Johnson, a black man—comes barely a year after a white man, Dylann Roof, allegedly shot nine black people to death in a church in Charleston, South Carolina. Roof told friends, and later police, that he wanted “to start a race war.” “He wanted it to be white with white, and black with black,” said a friend.

Roof’s manifesto echoed the ideas of Anders Behring Breivik, a white Christian nationalist who massacred 77 people in Norway five years ago. Breivik claimed to be defending “our people, our culture, Christendom and our nation.” He declared, “It is every European’s duty to defend their people and country against the ideology of genocide, conquest and destruction known as Islam.”

**Nothing helps Roof, Breivik, Duke, and other white nationalists more than hate** crimes by the people they vilify—blacks and Muslims—against whites, Christians, and police officers. No crime justifies such collective vilification. But as a social dynamic, **haters and killers on all sides work together**, by stoking feelings of group victimization and group vengeance.

#### That creates disembodied cogito-economic subjects and turns the case.

Dr Carl Rhodes and Dr John Garrick 2, Rhodes is Professor of Organization Studies and Deputy Dean at UTS Business School, University Fellow in Law at Charles Darwin University, “Economic metaphors and working knowledge: enter the ‘cogito-economic’ subject,” Human Resources Development International, 5(1), 87-97, 2002.

Introduction

In this paper we ask the question: what are the effects of defining knowledge in economic terms? In addressing this question, we particularly look at how the language of commerce has appropriated knowledge by defining it in its own terms. We then examine the effects of the metaphorical language that has emerged out of recent theorizations of knowledge, arguing that this has generated a powerful discourse that defines people as ‘cogito-economic subjects’. By defining people in this way, we suggest, there are potential dangers of metaphors becoming reified, such that knowledge becomes describable only in economic terms and people become describable only in cogito-economic terms. This implies that subjects are both ‘knowledge workers’ (cogito) and ‘human resources’ (economic). We propose that this represents a conflation of knowledge and commercial interests. We further argue that this can be problematic in so far as the conflation attempts to bring knowledge ‘under control’. In this way the people through whom such ‘working knowledge’ is mediated are meant to become more manageable. Indeed, the knowledge management systems of postindustrial organizations are, in part, both products and producers of this discourse.

With the advent of the post-industrial economy, knowledge has entered the workplace in ways that it never had before. The use of the term ‘post-industrialism’ itself is suggestive of ‘a shift in the structure of industrial capitalism away from mass production and bureaucracy and indicating changing technologies of production, a growth in the service sector and changes in the knowledge requirements of work’ (White and Jacques 1995: 48). Further, in post-industrial economies the management of work has also changed through the impact of information technology and the development of alternative organizational forms (Alvesson and Berg 1992). These new organizations in turn need people who do work in correspondingly new and different ways as, in the ‘knowledge economy’, work has become less physical and more discursive. Gee et al. aptly put it this way:

Contemporary, globally competitive businesses don’t any longer compete on the basis of their products or services per se. They compete, rather, on the basis of how much learning and knowledge they can use as leverage in order to expeditiously invent, produce, distribute and market their goods and services, as well as to innovatively vary and customize them. (Gee et al. 1996: 5)

Against this complex backdrop of such post-industrial work conditions, where might we epistemologically locate the ‘working knowledge’ that is now thought to be even more important than it was in the past? Further, how might we evaluate the effects of this form of knowledge? The emerging discourse of ‘working knowledge’ is indicative of a pragmatic turn in our orientation towards what counts as knowledge. Epistemologically, working knowledge is not only in work; it is what works. The question of what works is invariably a matter of judgement of the effect of knowledge on economic imperatives, with outcomes shaped by criteria such as economic growth, commercial projections and company research into areas such as consumer satisfaction. Working knowledge can, as a consequence, easily become a vehicle for forging particular policies or projects that represent dominant perspectives that are legitimated by commercial considerations. An important part of this legitimization is the employ- ment of a new language through which the knowledge requirements of the new economy are both articulated and created. This language employs terms such as ‘human capital’, ‘knowledge assets’, ‘the knowledge economy’, ‘the information economy’ and ‘knowledge workers’ to explore, define and create new ways of looking at knowledge. The way that knowledge is theorized has become increasingly mediated through economic, commercial and accounting metaphors such as ‘the balanced scorecard’ and ‘intangible assets’. In turn, these metaphors construct social understandings of working knowledge and professional practices.

The advent of knowledge work

Corporate managers and many academics have increasingly recognized professional knowledge as being ‘valid’ in its own right. It is knowledge that does not rely on validation established by scientific research, nor is it beholden to the legitimizing practices of the academy or the ‘research centre’. Working knowledge emanates from actually doing the work. In The Reective Practitioner, Schön (1983) convincingly argued that knowledge, of an action-oriented character, is embedded in professional activity and can be subject to real-time critical reection by professional practitioners. In Schön’s sense of practice, professional knowledge is potentially open-ended – even in its action elements – with reective abilities being pivotal. In this knowledge, good professional practice involves making and reecting on the best judgements in specic contexts, for ethical as well as commercial considerations. Work is both site and instrument of evaluating such working knowledge. The business world and the corporate sector in particular now encourage new, even critical, ideas (Drucker 1995) (although thoroughgoing critique, we would argue, continues to be largely discouraged). If ‘working knowledge’ is to be a coherent construction and not just a fashionable description of particular elements of technological-age work, or a disguise for purely technical and financial interests, it should follow that adequate avenues for reexivity need to be built into its production. This is a key challenge for the action-oriented research approaches now favoured by many organizations. Transparency, openness, critical self-reection, highly developed systems that promote peer assessment and review, and the development of professional associations that have contact with the academic world would be among possible components of a new epistemological ‘infrastructure’ for working knowledge. And there are signs that such components are beginning to take shape. Government higher education policies across European Union member nations, the US, Canada and Australia are actively encouraging new university–industry partnering arrangements emphasizing collaborative research between faculties and particular companies and flexible and work-based (as distinct from classroom-based) approaches to learning. What is at stake is both the character of what we take knowledge to be and, even more seriously, the extent to which we are moving towards – or away from – a more open society. In a global world saturated by information available through the Internet, openness may turn out to be one pragmatic option. In the ‘knowledge society’, the issue arises as to where an organization is positioned in terms of knowledge – with which knowledge networks is it connected (Castells 1997)? Barnett expands on this ‘positioning’, pointing out that: We are seeing the rise of corporate universities – such as that in the UK spawned by British Aerospace – but they are not noted for their sponsorship among their employees of receptivity to Greek philosophy or the nineteenth century novel. A knowledge audit would reveal that they focus on technical and managerial knowledge; and, even there, will want to develop among their employees certain usable knowledges – and their associated skills – with likely productive value for the organization. (Barnett 2000: 20) Such developments are indicative of changes in knowledge that are brought about by the new role that corporations play in knowledge production. This new role, in turn, shapes the relationships that people can have with the corporations where they are employed and works to impose limits on the subjectivities available to them. Edwards and Tait (2000) argue that this ‘willing’ employee entails ‘an active subjectivity’ – aligned to organizational goals – producing what Casey (1995) terms ‘designer employees’. As we pointed out in our introduction, in the context of post-industrial work conditions, the epistemological location of ‘working knowledge’ is indeed problematic. The advent of ‘working knowledge’ demonstrates a pragmatic orientation to knowl- edge, where knowledge is not only in work; it is what works(Garrick and Rhodes 2000: 8). Based on such pragmatism, the ‘working’ in knowledge can become a way to dene workplace practices that seek to reinforce and privilege ways of being and knowing that are judged illegitimate if they do not reect commercial interests. The danger here is not that knowledge can be of value to commercial interests in itself, but rather that commerce becomes the sole criterion for judging knowledge. For instance, with modern information and communications technologies (and the call from shareholders for greater accountability), new possibilities for openness and mutual evaluation are being generated, but nonetheless commercial discourses certainly remain dominant. As such, Lyotard’s question: ‘who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?’ (1984: 9) remains very pertinent to developing reexive approaches to knowledge work. Metaphors: signifying knowledge at work The very notion of ‘working knowledge’ is suggestive of a historicization that claims we have moved from an agrarian to an industrial and then, in the post-World War Two era, to a knowledge and information society. Hand in hand with the notion of the ‘knowledge society’ has come a new range of signiers used to dene people. Moving away from just referring to people as ‘workers’, ‘employees’ or ‘staff’, these new signiers rely heavily on terminology related to both economics and knowledge. One of the earliest examples of this was the idea of ‘human capital’ (Schultz 1961). Schultz’s argument was that much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital – the productive capabilities of human beings. These capabilities, in Schultz’s human capital perspective, are acquired at a cost and, in turn, command a price in the labour market – the level of which depends on how useful they are in producing goods and services. Since then, there has been a proliferation of terms expanding on this basic premise to describe people in economic and/or knowledge terms. Such terms include ‘human resource development’ (HRD) and the related practices of ‘human resource management’ (HRM), ‘knowledge workers’, ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge capital’ and, more recently, the managerial jargon of ‘employees are our greatest asset’. One common characteristic of this terminology is the use of economic metaphors such as capital, resources and assets to describe people at work. We believe that attention to the development of such metaphors is important as they provide valuable insights into life in commercial organizations. Palmer and Dunford (1996) also point out that some metaphors may be so embedded in particular contexts that they come to constitute an ‘authentic’ discourse that permits no flexibility or change in ways of looking at organizations and the people in them. Here attempts at introducing new ideas or metaphors might nd it hard not to be ‘colonized’ by existing dominant organizational metaphors. The notion of ‘human resources’ serves as a good example of part of such an ‘authentic discourse’ – one that has ‘graduated’ to now being a dead metaphor, that is, a metaphor whose metaphoricity is forgotten. The growth of the use of the term ‘human resources’ in popular management books, academic texts, management education subjects and the naming of functional departments in organizations has come to see the ‘human resource’ as being a dominant term used to refer to people in work organizations. The use of the term ‘resource’ to describe people here loses its metaphoric character and is readily seen as a literal term to describe people. The word ‘resource’, however, has a genealogy that relates back to the description of economic and nancial phenomena – where a resource refers to a means of producing wealth or property that can be converted into money. Here the use of the word ‘resource’ becomes a metaphor to describe people, but it is a metaphor borrowed from the corporate domain in which people are dened in terms of managerial prerogatives. Much of the terminology that has emerged to dene people in the postindustrial context uses this textual practice. Intellectual capital, knowledge capital and human capital are other prime illustrations, each working to dene people in terms of their central concept: capital itself. Capital is the wealth that is employed in order to produce goods and services, and people become linguistically subsumed as just another form of capital. The metaphor translates ‘being’ through the terminology of commerce – thus the cogito-economic subject.

The use of such metaphors to drive representations of people at work is a way of exerting control over the identities of those people. Defining people in particular terms and using particular metaphors foregrounds certain ways of understanding people and backgrounds others (Rhodes 2000) – in the case described here, the economic metaphors do this too, they draw attention to people as economic subjects (capital, assets, resources) that are inputs into an organizational system. This is a profound example of the politics of representation at work where overtly benign descriptions enact powerful controls over the subject positions open to people in particular social contexts. As Cooper puts it:

Technologies of representation convert the inaccessible, unknown and private into the accessible, known and public; they convert the deferred and faraway into the instantaneous and immediate; and their portability and mobility makes them easy to manipulate and control. (Cooper 1992: 267)

In terms of commercial organizations, Deetz has suggested that the development of industrialization replaced a set of representations based on ‘intrinsic’ values with one based on a system of exchange values represented by money. It is here that ‘labour became articulated as a “cost” to the organization’ (1995: 228). Deetz goes on to argue that, for the modern corporation, the reason for working is to make money and any alternative motives are considered only in terms of their effect on commitment, productivity and sales as translated in monetary terms. This is a privileging of a monetary code as a representation practice in which everything is economic: everything including people. Such privileging serves to enact a form of control through which economic subjects emerge out of the very interests that seek to define people in those (economic) terms.

In contemporary organization and management studies literature, definitions of people in economic terms have taken a further turn from that described by Deetz. The use of language such as ‘working knowledge’, ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge assets’ and so forth takes the use of economic metaphor and adds to it another powerful linguistic substitution. The first turn is to use economic metaphor to describe people; the second turn is to introduce the synecdoche of knowledge and intellect. Synecdoche works in this way to use a part of something to describe the whole – it is people’s intellectual capacity and their knowledge that is used to describe their ‘whole’. The result is the creation of a disembodied subjectivity that defines people economically and focuses their ‘value’ in terms of their intellectual capacity – again as cogito-economic subjects. For instance, an economic person might be one whose person is knowledge. Deetz argues that such practices create a ‘closed politics . . . owing to a variety of practices which produce and privilege certain interests – principally managerial – in both public decision making and in the production of the type of person that exists in modern organizations and society’ (1995: 215). Our concern is that an arena is constructed where the only legitimate knowledge might be that which is deemed economically viable and the only legitimate subjectivity is one where people are defined in these terms.

Enter Jacques

Usure

In order to explore further how this play of metaphor works, this section of the paper will use Derrida’s (1982) discussion of the use of metaphor in philosophy to review analogously the use of cogito-economic metaphors to define selves. Derrida (1982) uses the term ‘usure’ to examine the use of metaphor in philosophy. He uses this term in relation to its double meaning in the French language – usure as usury (i.e. the acquisition of too much interest) and usure as using up or the deterioration through usage. The usure of metaphor, therefore, is simultaneously the rubbing away of the original and the creation of ‘linguistic surplus value’. A metaphor such as the ‘human resource’ can be used to illustrate this. In the metaphorical term ‘resource’ there is a suggestion that human resources were something else prior to the ‘resource’ metaphor being applied and becoming commonplace. It implies an original, concrete figure of a pre-economic subject, equivalent to what might have been considered the literal meaning of ‘being human’. The first move of the usure of metaphor, then, is to wear out an ‘original meaning’; for the metaphor to no longer be noticed and to be taken for the ‘proper’ meaning.1 The metaphor is used, ‘human resources’ is worn out as its apparent metaphoricity is suspended. People are no longer seen as resources but are resources.

At the same time as the wearing out occurs, the metaphor is also producing a surplus value – a ‘tropic supplementarity’ (Derrida 1982: 210): ‘The supplementary product of a capital, the exchange which far from losing the original investment would fructify its initial wealth, would increase its return in the form of revenue, additional interest, linguistic surplus value’ (1982: 210).

Here the distinction between the two parts of the word ‘usure’ is indistinguishable. There is a proliferation of the signifier that is created, as meaning is displaced from one term to another – for example from worker to resource. Describing people as workers focuses on their activity; as resource it focuses on their value to the enterprise. The usure of the metaphor thus creates a surplus of meaning. This is a supplement – a substitutive signification – ‘which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the “real” supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement’ (Derrida 1976: 7). Metaphor then creates surplus as one signier is replaced by another – in this case through the metaphor of person as signied as a ‘resource’: as well as what a person might have been before, now there is more; now a person is also a resource. The adoption of a new use of language to describe people is therefore not innocent. It is not just about using different words to signify the same thing. Rather, translating concepts from one signier to another (in our illustration from ‘person’ to ‘resource’) cannot be pure, transparent or unequivocal. Paraphrasing Derrida (1996), the meaning of a concept is not separable from the process of passage or from the signifying operation. The translation to the new signifier is generative – it is a supplement that does not just substitute for a signied or a previous signifier, but rather it emerges as something new. Describing people in cogito-economic terms therefore does not reflect the ‘reality’ of what it means to be a person, but rather it generates and potentially attempts to finalize that reality in a particular way.

We are not suggesting that the metaphor is ‘concrete’ so that it can be traced to its origins, for instance, to get at the true meaning of being a ‘person’. Our point, rather, is that the economic metaphor does work by producing and supplementing. But it does not replace a pre-metaphoric reality where people (subjects) were literal rather than gurative. Nor are we writing nostalgically; there is no turning back from the usure of metaphor. It follows that ‘working knowledge’ cannot be brought into question because it uses gurative language; but it can be questioned in terms of how it uses gurative language.

Scraped again

As we discussed earlier, post-industrial conditions and the so-called ‘information economy’ have further developed the economic metaphor by adding to it a knowledge element. This is a double substitution where an increasingly dominant way of looking at people is as cogito-economic subjects. The creation of the cogito-economic subject is the result of metaphor, but it is a metaphor without literal origin – a subject that cannot transcend its signiers. The debate then turns not to a longing for authentic experience, but to a discussion of the effects of the usure.

This effect is what Derrida describes (metaphorically) as a ‘palimpsest’. Palimpsest comes from the Greek meaning ‘scraped again’, and refers to a parchment, papyrus or other writing material where the original text has been removed so that it can be reused. Before paper became an easily available and inexpensive commodity, this common practice involved old surfaces being scrubbed so that they could be written on multiple times (Murn and Ray 1998). Despite this, even though the original text was scraped off, the older text is still recoverable by the use of means such as ultraviolet light. To consider a word a palimpsest draws attention to the multiple levels of signication that exist in that word. Despite the ‘scrubbing of meaning’ and its metaphorical replacement, a trace of what has been replaced always exists, ‘inscribed in white ink’. This is not to suggest that the meaning that has been replaced was in some way ‘original’ or non-metaphorical. Rather, one sign has been used to designate another in a chain of signification where new signs work to erode, rub out and use up the signs that they replace.

Working knowledge and the cogito-economic subject

Our argument is that contemporary times are seeing the cogito-economic subject emerging through a discourse that uses commercial language to re-write the palimpsest of the self. Indeed, the processes of industrialism have generated dominant discourses on selfhood that both ‘shape the character of the modern self throughout modern industrialism and delimit the context of our thinking on self’ (Casey 1995: 50). It is here that discursive processes of work shape industrial selves through a ‘hidden curriculum’ that produces ‘acculturated employees’(1995: 78). This type of economicself is constructed as desirable in the contemporary work order. Such a self is dened not as an autonomous object, but rather as a subject dened positionally and relationally. The question then changes from: ‘Who denes the terms of the organization to who is dened by them and how these denitions determine organizational identity?’(Baack and Prasch 1997: 136).

The cogito-economic self then exists in a discourse that works to define people in such terms and simultaneously rub out other forms of self, supplementing them with terms that resonate with organizational imperatives. In this way a discourse becomes powerful. When its metaphor is used up, people must contend with the emergent (powerful) discourse in terms of how they define themselves and are defined by others.

#### The literalization of the marketplace metaphor applied to debate tacitly endorses neoliberal ideology by assuming regulation is normatively undesirable.

Thomas W. Joo 14, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law, “The Worst Test of Truth: The "Marketplace of Ideas" as Faulty Metaphor,” Tulane Law Review, 89, 383, December 2014, lexis.

IV. Conclusion

As every grade-school English student learns, a metaphor is a figure of speech stating that one thing "is" another. Metaphors can work considerable mischief when that equation is taken literally. First Amendment jurisprudence takes literally the metaphorical statement that speech "is" a market. That is, rather than merely drawing figurative parallels between public discourse and economic markets, it collapses them into a single concept called "markets." 319Link to the text of the note This literalization of the legal metaphor has been helped along by economic analyses of law and policy, which have insisted that nearly all forms of social activity are literally economic markets. 320Link to the text of the note

At the same time that the scope of "market" has been expanding, the scope of "speech" protected under the First Amendment has been expanding as well. Justice Holmes and Justice Brennan cleverly deployed market rhetoric when it fit the zeitgeist of the Lochner and Cold War eras. More recently, it has been argued, corporations and business interests have turned the tables and displayed similar rhetorical "opportunism" by reframing their economic rights arguments in the more appealing language of the First Amendment. 321Link to the text of the note A long line of campaign finance cases, culminating most recently in Citizens United, has treated spending in support of candidates as speech, regardless of the identity of the spender. Commercial speech, once considered outside the First Amendment, enjoys considerable [\*432] constitutional protection. The First Amendment also protects nonverbal conduct; it "does not end at the spoken or written word." 322Link to the text of the note

If everything is a market, and everything is speech, then everything is both market and speech, and the two categories are literally coterminous - but so broad as to be meaningless. If everything is a market, and markets should not be regulated, then nothing - neither speech nor anything else - should be regulated. As markets and speech (and everything else) collapse into a single notion, the "marketplace of ideas" rhetoric is no longer specifically about any of the values involved in free speech theory, such as expressive rights, listeners' interests, preventing government suppression of dissent, or the search for "truth" (whether normative or empirical). Nor is it about any of the important functions of markets, such as efficient allocation of resources or setting prices to reflect demand. It is simply antiregulatory. Skepticism of government is of course consistent with a long and fundamental libertarian tradition in Anglo-American thought. But the metaphor is more than skeptical. Because it lacks insights into how to limit regulation, it reduces to free-market and free-speech absolutism.

Furthermore, the marketplace of ideas metaphor advances an argument that fails on its own terms. It purports to be an instrumental theory based on the observed characteristics of markets - that is, it argues that speech deregulation will produce a good (i.e., "truth") in the way that unregulated markets allegedly do. But market processes do not produce truth, and the law polices markets vigorously for this very reason. There are of course many reasons to be skeptical of government regulation of both speech and of markets, but those reasons are specific to the distinct institutions of speech and those of economic markets. By claiming to identify "truth" as a shared reason for deregulating speech and markets, the marketplace metaphor ignores the actual, valuable functions of both speech and markets.

The marketplace rhetoric also illuminates the use of metaphor in legal argument and elsewhere. As this Article has argued, metaphors are often normative assertions disguised as reasoned analogical arguments. While a metaphor purports to use our knowledge about one phenomenon (such as "markets") to provide insights into a second phenomenon (such as "speech"), it is actually making arguments about [\*433] both the first and second phenomena. 323Link to the text of the note That is, the marketplace metaphor not only advances the assertion that speech should be unregulated like markets, but also tacitly advances the unexamined assertion that markets themselves should be unregulated.